Anti-corruption laws are generally failing all over the world. Can regulation -- rather than legislation - hold the answer to more effectively fighting corruption? In this 'how to' episode, we describe 10 years of research on writing these rules. We argue that these rules teach us about the way administrative law is evolving - and how anti-corruption law forms its own area worthy of study. For the papers we referenced, see: 1. Drafting International Regulations:...
We find that financial centres balance democracy and autocracy, depending on trends in other international financial centres. Democracy can encourage financial innovation. Yet, autocracy can encourage 'focus' and cost-saving measures. The question is not whether an international financial centre benefits from becoming more democratic -- but whether it benefits by becoming more democratic RIGHT NOW.
Data do not speak for themselves. Only a model can help us make sense of the flood of data we see. Only econometric analysis helps us separate the signal from the noise. We review our model and the way we adjust global financial networks for distorting variables like the way economies shift over time.
Many people see democracy as bad for developing an international financial centre. Qatar. UAE. Moscow. Istanbul. Jersey. Malta. Shanghai... the list goes on. We describe why the question holds extra relevance now in the Brexit and Hong Kong full reversion to Mainland authority - and review our findings.
Central banks conduct monetary policy mostly through government securities markets (ie they buy and sell government bills, bonds, etc.) -- when not directly tampering with interest rates. Why should governments buy companies' securities directly - rather than support banks to do this? For more, see: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3023795
Which central banks' private securities purchases would contribute the most toward real investment in their jurisdiction(s)? Such monetary policy helps most when conventional monetary policy has failed (or will likely fail because of liquidity traps) and the executive part of government sags in corruption and incompetence. For more, see: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3023795
Econometric evidence shows a pretty clear line between central bank unconventional monetary policy (outright purchases) and output - usually because of its effects via money policy mechanisms. What about its effects on real investment (like in DNA sequencers, 3D printers, IP patents and "real" investment)? For more, see: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3023795
Central banks around the world bought up alot of securities. To what extent have central banks turned to buying private sector securities in a macroeconomic environment characterised by zero percent interest rates, low growth, investment, and ballooning debts? For more, see: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3023795
Why can't central banks normally buy stocks and bonds from the private sector? What happens if/when they do? We introduce our subject, and quickly present our findings (that central bank purchases can promote investment under certain circumstances). For more, see: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3023795
Why don't central banks buy our companies' stocks and bonds? Should they fund mostly governments? And expand credit through banks? We look at central banks' role as a "funder of last resort." We find that investment increases when central banks buy private sector assets - except under a certain "sloth effect." We describe how law fails to give central banks the authority they need - and show how drafting a nominal GDP target objective directly into the central bank law helps promote...
Most governments copied competition law "best practice" - without accompanying templates on improving innovation/productivity. Competition acts are easy to copy. New ideas are not. Some countries like Singapore and Hong Kong will win out from more competition. Vietnam and even Japan won't -- unless law incentivises creativity. To see how much money your country will win/lose, see: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3000240
Like with central banks, conventional wisdom has increasingly made competition authorities (commissions) independent. How does such independence look like in black letter law? Does the econometric evidence suggest that independence makes competition "better"? For more, see: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3000240
Competition law helps shape competition in a jurisdiction. "Better" laws help protect vulnerable businesses like small and medium enterprises (SMEs) - without hurting consumers. How do we measure the quality of such competition law? Who is ahead... and behind? For more, see: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3000240
SMEs provide much employment and longer-term economic growth. They also often provide the next, new idea which leads to entire industries. Which countries encourage these SMEs? How competitive are they? For more, see: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3000240
Competition often hurts SMEs more than helps them. In this presentation, we review competition laws in various countries (mostly Asia and Brunei as a concrete example). Without passing innovation legislation at the same time, competition law could well do more harm than good. For more, see: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3000240
What concrete laws can a jurisdiction pass to make its financial institutions more attractive for sunrise industries looking for money? We illustrate how new laws in Hong Kong can make its financial institutions ready to fund the complex and capital-intensive industries like the solar/photovoltaic sector. For more, see: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2495259
An international financial centre represents a technology, a method of generating information about new opportunities and risks. We describe the value of information in an international financial centre using China's solar industry and Hong Kong's financing of that industry as an example. For more, see: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2495259
Benefits from securitisation well exceed the current offering of securitised debt and assets. An international financial centre ready to securitise a sunrise industry can fill a large void -- and earn large profits. Hong Kong's own experience has been to make casino bet instruments, rather than productive assets. Yet, it does not have to be that way. For more, see: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2495259
How can an international financial centre dominate a sunrise industry's value chains? In this presentation, we show how US financial institutions disintermediated China's solar energy financing value chains -- locking out rivals in Hong Kong. For more, see: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2495259
What drives the development of an international financial centre? We show how to estimate the economic impacts of a sunrise industry on a financial centre like Hong Kong. We also estimate the supply/demand for various types of securities used to fund the solar industry. For more, see: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2495259