Wanda Dalian Chairman Jian-Lin WANG had a decision to make. Should he, and Wanda by implication, compete with Disney aggressively, or do something else? What should the company's grand strategy be? And what is the role of the People's Republic's government in all this? This teaching video should help you with the issues behind the case study. Listen to the case study here -- and read it on the link below. Look at the YouTube video for pointers from the Teaching Note. And prepare to think...
Anti-corruption laws are generally failing all over the world. Can regulation -- rather than legislation - hold the answer to more effectively fighting corruption? In this 'how to' episode, we describe 10 years of research on writing these rules. We argue that these rules teach us about the way administrative law is evolving - and how anti-corruption law forms its own area worthy of study. For the papers we referenced, see: 1. Drafting International Regulations:...
We find that financial centres balance democracy and autocracy, depending on trends in other international financial centres. Democracy can encourage financial innovation. Yet, autocracy can encourage 'focus' and cost-saving measures. The question is not whether an international financial centre benefits from becoming more democratic -- but whether it benefits by becoming more democratic RIGHT NOW.
Data do not speak for themselves. Only a model can help us make sense of the flood of data we see. Only econometric analysis helps us separate the signal from the noise. We review our model and the way we adjust global financial networks for distorting variables like the way economies shift over time.
Glancing at the data may show that democracy serves as the best incubator for financial centre success. We show the data - before applying the usual adjustments and controls which rigorous scientists would apply to make the data more reliable. We show how autocracy plays a greater role than one might think.
Many people see democracy as bad for developing an international financial centre. Qatar. UAE. Moscow. Istanbul. Jersey. Malta. Shanghai... the list goes on. We describe why the question holds extra relevance now in the Brexit and Hong Kong full reversion to Mainland authority - and review our findings.
Does democracy or autocracy political institutions best allow policymakers to grow their international financial centres? In this presentation, we show how these centres must respond to each other. Democratic inclusion in one place depends on another place. So does its centrality in the global financial system. We describe the importance of this question, tell what the data say, describe our view of the world and the way we must fix our data and finally present our results. Our research has...
Central banks conduct monetary policy mostly through government securities markets (ie they buy and sell government bills, bonds, etc.) -- when not directly tampering with interest rates. Why should governments buy companies' securities directly - rather than support banks to do this? For more, see: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3023795
Which central banks' private securities purchases would contribute the most toward real investment in their jurisdiction(s)? Such monetary policy helps most when conventional monetary policy has failed (or will likely fail because of liquidity traps) and the executive part of government sags in corruption and incompetence. For more, see: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3023795
Econometric evidence shows a pretty clear line between central bank unconventional monetary policy (outright purchases) and output - usually because of its effects via money policy mechanisms. What about its effects on real investment (like in DNA sequencers, 3D printers, IP patents and "real" investment)? For more, see: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3023795
Would unconventional monetary policy aimed at buying private sector securities (stocks and bonds) helped boost lackluster investment? Particularly in developing and emerging markets? We look at the role that central banks - as funders of last resort - might have played in promoting investment. For more, see: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3023795
Central banks around the world bought up alot of securities. To what extent have central banks turned to buying private sector securities in a macroeconomic environment characterised by zero percent interest rates, low growth, investment, and ballooning debts? For more, see: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3023795
Why can't central banks normally buy stocks and bonds from the private sector? What happens if/when they do? We introduce our subject, and quickly present our findings (that central bank purchases can promote investment under certain circumstances). For more, see: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3023795
Why don't central banks buy our companies' stocks and bonds? Should they fund mostly governments? And expand credit through banks? We look at central banks' role as a "funder of last resort." We find that investment increases when central banks buy private sector assets - except under a certain "sloth effect." We describe how law fails to give central banks the authority they need - and show how drafting a nominal GDP target objective directly into the central bank law helps promote...
Most governments copied competition law "best practice" - without accompanying templates on improving innovation/productivity. Competition acts are easy to copy. New ideas are not. Some countries like Singapore and Hong Kong will win out from more competition. Vietnam and even Japan won't -- unless law incentivises creativity. To see how much money your country will win/lose, see: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3000240
The international organisations have pressured most countries into adopting competition laws. Many governments rightfully ignore them - because they harm domestic business (and particularly SMEs). If lawmakers adopt an innovation act at the same time as an antitrust act though, competition law can do more good than harm. For more, see: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3000240
Like with central banks, conventional wisdom has increasingly made competition authorities (commissions) independent. How does such independence look like in black letter law? Does the econometric evidence suggest that independence makes competition "better"? For more, see: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3000240
Competition law helps shape competition in a jurisdiction. "Better" laws help protect vulnerable businesses like small and medium enterprises (SMEs) - without hurting consumers. How do we measure the quality of such competition law? Who is ahead... and behind? For more, see: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3000240
SMEs provide much employment and longer-term economic growth. They also often provide the next, new idea which leads to entire industries. Which countries encourage these SMEs? How competitive are they? For more, see: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3000240