Infographic Instant with Bryane Michael

Backgrounder to the story on Puma

In this brief chat, I review whether Bitcoins, scamcoins, digital coins and tokens can ever be real money. The answer: yes — if they have real ‘stuff’ backing them up. Most every tradable good/service (like chocolate) need prices to sit in a real economy. Py=mv is more than simple maths. It is the future of digital currencies. I give two sets of recommendations: 1- to you and I, and 2- to regulators. For us, we can protect ourselves be looking for the underlying value behind the ‘coin’. No real pig— I’m probably the Greater Fool. For regulators, a “real economy=real use” case for their regulator seems like the right way forward. Lets not get bogs down in regulatory requirements, exempt some with sandboxes.. and bureaucratize financial markets more. Use a simple approach. If the users had an honest, real use in mind — a price wipe wipeout, auto-contract glitch or 1,000 other problems were probably all innocent victims. Restitution goes like normal. Getting ‘Hushpuppied’ probably should get fraud investigators out there quickly. In a ever complex regulatory landscape, Michael’s appeal for a simpler, common sense, tied-to-our-shoes approach approach toward regulation seems desperately called for. NONE OF THE REMARKS MADE REFLECT THE OPINIONS OF ANY INSTITUTION I MAY AFFILIATE WITH, NOW, PAST OR FUTURE. I DONT THINK I GAVE AN AFFILIATION FOR THAT PURPOSE.

We are building the new internet on the bones of the old. Like the early attempts to build airplanes using flappable wings. We take our grandfathers' understanding of law and economics - and try to apply it to Web3. In this podcast, I describe how a new set of laws and conventions could help us break out of the 'lock in' which keeps us using New Tech (blockchains, lithium-ion, artificial intelligence, tokens) like the wood and paper of old tech. I give examples of how FinTech could change the way we live. And how 70-80 year old men simple add-on to existing law. Like taking the law on horse-driven transport and replacing the word 'car' for 'horse' in the new law. Dumb. Yet, true.

Most of us use theories and empirical results from development economics all day long at the office. What if much of it led to under-development because of a shadowy group of advocates (or those who profess) benefit from bad theory and practice? I describe this Shadow Professoriate, the rules that keep it going strong, and their wages. I provide ball-park estimates of the harm they cause and how they cause this harm. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4188018

Afraid to arbitrate a dispute because you don't want to spend thousands of dollars on lawyers? You don't need to. In this clip, I tell you everything you need to know about finding and hiring an arbitrator like me, the arbitration process and what you can expect to get out of it.

Why Do Economists Use Models? by Bryane Michael

Governments are trying to procure innovative FinTech sectors. Yet, no one yet knows what such FinTech should look like. In our paper, we look at how to amend existing procurement law domestically and internationally. For the paper: http://ssrn.com/abstract=3976018.

Another memorization dump for the AICP exam.

Wanda Dalian Chairman Jian-Lin WANG had a decision to make. Should he, and Wanda by implication, compete with Disney aggressively, or do something else? What should the company's grand strategy be? And what is the role of the People's Republic's government in all this? This teaching video should help you with the issues behind the case study. Listen to the case study here -- and read it on the link below. Look at the YouTube video for pointers from the Teaching Note. And prepare to think about the major issues involved in the case. For advanced MBA and management students and executives following related courses. Case Study: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3169121

Anti-corruption laws are generally failing all over the world. Can regulation -- rather than legislation - hold the answer to more effectively fighting corruption? In this 'how to' episode, we describe 10 years of research on writing these rules. We argue that these rules teach us about the way administrative law is evolving - and how anti-corruption law forms its own area worthy of study. For the papers we referenced, see: 1. Drafting International Regulations: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=995978 2. Designing a Preventive AC Agency: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1468957 3. Lessons from the OECD: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2250999 4. Auditing Anti-Corruption Regulations: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2226501 5. Foreign law giving a helping hand: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2270964 6. Ethics-related regulations: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2354630

We find that financial centres balance democracy and autocracy, depending on trends in other international financial centres. Democracy can encourage financial innovation. Yet, autocracy can encourage 'focus' and cost-saving measures. The question is not whether an international financial centre benefits from becoming more democratic -- but whether it benefits by becoming more democratic RIGHT NOW.

Data do not speak for themselves. Only a model can help us make sense of the flood of data we see. Only econometric analysis helps us separate the signal from the noise. We review our model and the way we adjust global financial networks for distorting variables like the way economies shift over time.

Glancing at the data may show that democracy serves as the best incubator for financial centre success. We show the data - before applying the usual adjustments and controls which rigorous scientists would apply to make the data more reliable. We show how autocracy plays a greater role than one might think.

Many people see democracy as bad for developing an international financial centre. Qatar. UAE. Moscow. Istanbul. Jersey. Malta. Shanghai... the list goes on. We describe why the question holds extra relevance now in the Brexit and Hong Kong full reversion to Mainland authority - and review our findings.

Does democracy or autocracy political institutions best allow policymakers to grow their international financial centres? In this presentation, we show how these centres must respond to each other. Democratic inclusion in one place depends on another place. So does its centrality in the global financial system. We describe the importance of this question, tell what the data say, describe our view of the world and the way we must fix our data and finally present our results. Our research has implications from Brexit to Hong Kong post-2047... and everything in-between.

Central banks conduct monetary policy mostly through government securities markets (ie they buy and sell government bills, bonds, etc.) -- when not directly tampering with interest rates. Why should governments buy companies' securities directly - rather than support banks to do this? For more, see: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3023795

Which central banks' private securities purchases would contribute the most toward real investment in their jurisdiction(s)? Such monetary policy helps most when conventional monetary policy has failed (or will likely fail because of liquidity traps) and the executive part of government sags in corruption and incompetence. For more, see: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3023795

Econometric evidence shows a pretty clear line between central bank unconventional monetary policy (outright purchases) and output - usually because of its effects via money policy mechanisms. What about its effects on real investment (like in DNA sequencers, 3D printers, IP patents and "real" investment)? For more, see: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3023795

Would unconventional monetary policy aimed at buying private sector securities (stocks and bonds) helped boost lackluster investment? Particularly in developing and emerging markets? We look at the role that central banks - as funders of last resort - might have played in promoting investment. For more, see: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3023795

Central banks around the world bought up alot of securities. To what extent have central banks turned to buying private sector securities in a macroeconomic environment characterised by zero percent interest rates, low growth, investment, and ballooning debts? For more, see: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3023795