Economie des institutions, de l'innovation et de la croissance - Philippe Aghion

Philippe Aghion Chaire Économie des institutions, de l'innovation et de la croissance Collège de France Année 2025-2026 07 - Innovation et croissance à travers l'histoire : US-Europe-Chine

Philippe Aghion Chaire Économie des institutions, de l'innovation et de la croissance Collège de France Année 2025-2026 06 - Innovation et croissance à travers l'histoire : Stagnation séculaire

Philippe Aghion Chaire Économie des institutions, de l'innovation et de la croissance Collège de France Année 2025-2026 05 - Innovation et croissance à travers l'histoire : L'adversité comme levier d'innovation

Philippe Aghion Chaire Économie des institutions, de l'innovation et de la croissance Collège de France Année 2025-2026 04 - Innovation et croissance à travers l'histoire : Les vagues technologiques

Philippe Aghion Collège de France Économie des institutions, de l'innovation et de la croissance Année 2025-2026 03 - Innovation et croissance à travers l'histoire : Trappe malthusienne et transition démographique

Philippe Aghion Collège de France Économie des institutions, de l'innovation et de la croissance Année 2025-2026 02 - Innovation et croissance à travers l'histoire : Révolution agricole, urbanisation

Philippe Aghion Collège de France Économie des institutions, de l'innovation et de la croissance Année 2025-2026 Japanese Economy : Demographic Challenges Takeo Hoshi est invité par l'assemblée du Collège de France sur proposition du Pr Philippe Aghion. Takeo Hoshi : Professeur d'économie et directeur du Tokyo College, université de Tokyo Résumé One of the most pressing issues facing the Japanese economy in recent decades is the set of profound demographic changes. Japan has been experiencing simultaneous shifts: an overall decline in population, a rapid acceleration of population aging, low fertility rates, and a marked decline in the scale of internal migration. Each of these factors interacts with the economy in complex ways. In this lecture, I argue that although demographic change is often cited as the main culprit behind Japan's long stagnation, its direct impact on economic growth has been smaller than that of the slowdown in productivity growth. The exception, however, lies in the decline of internal migration, which has had a more immediate effect on labor market fluidity and regional dynamism. Japan's population peaked around 2008 at approximately 128 million people. Since then, the number has steadily declined, falling below 125 million by the early 2020s, and projections suggest that by the middle of this century it may shrink to near 100 million or even lower. Population decline naturally raises concerns about the shrinking of domestic markets, reduced tax revenues, and the sustainability of public services. However, from a macroeconomic perspective, population size alone does not necessarily reduce per capita income growth. Countries with smaller populations than Japan—such as Switzerland or the Scandinavian nations—have achieved high levels of prosperity. What matters more is the ability of an economy to generate productivity growth and adapt its institutions to demographic realities. Closely tied to the overall decline is the remarkable speed of population aging. Japan is already the world's oldest society, with more than 28 percent of its population aged 65 and older. This share is projected to reach one-third within the next decade. Aging raises fiscal and social challenges: increased expenditures on pensions, health care, and long-term care, coupled with a shrinking working population that supports these systems. Economists debate whether aging itself is a drag on productivity growth. Some argue that an older workforce may be less innovative or less mobile; others note that older workers often bring experience and stability. What is more certain is that aging imposes heavy redistributional pressures. Given the current social security systems in advanced countries, it requires governments to tax, borrow, or cut spending elsewhere in order to finance the growing needs to support the elderly. A key driver of both population decline and aging is Japan's low fertility rate. For more than four decades, Japan's total fertility rate has hovered well below the replacement level of a little bit above 2. In recent years, it has dropped to around 1.3 or even lower. Policymakers often frame low fertility as the cause of economic stagnation, but the causality may run in the opposite direction. Economic uncertainty, sluggish wage growth, long working hours, and high costs of childrearing have made family formation more difficult for younger generations. In particular, the severe constraints on women—who face strong pressures to choose between family and career—contribute to delayed marriage and fewer births. The underdevelopment of childcare infrastructure, persistent gender wage gaps, and rigid corporate practices all reinforce this trend. Thus, low fertility should be understood not just as a demographic phenomenon, but as a reflection of deep structural and social issues within Japanese society. Among the demographic shifts, the decline in internal migration deserves special emphasis. Historically, Japan's...

Philippe Aghion Collège de France Économie des institutions, de l'innovation et de la croissance Année 2025-2026 01 - Innovation et croissance à travers l'histoire : Introduction

Philippe Aghion Collège de France Économie des institutions, de l'innovation et de la croissance Année 2025-2026 Conférence - Takeo Hoshi : Rapid Growth and Long Stagnation Takeo Hoshi est invité par l'assemblée du Collège de France sur proposition du Pr Philippe Aghion. Takeo Hoshi : Professeur d'économie et directeur du Tokyo College, université de Tokyo Résumé Japan's postwar economic growth is often described as a miracle, and for good reason. Having suffered immense destruction during the Second World War—with roughly one quarter of its national wealth and production facilities lost—the country emerged from devastation and rebuilt rapidly. Early stabilization policies, such as the Dodge Plan, helped curb postwar hyperinflation, and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 brought a surge of demand for Japanese goods. This laid the foundation for what became known as the rapid economic growth period. Between 1950 and 1973, Japan's real GNP expanded at an average annual rate exceeding 9 percent. Growth accounting exercises show that capital accumulation was important: Japan invested heavily in physical capital, supported by high savings rates. Labor force increase also contributed, but the most significant factor was the acceleration of productivity growth. Total factor productivity accounted for more than half of Japan's overall growth in this era, highlighting the role of technological catch-up and improvements in efficiency. The catch-up process followed the logic of diminishing marginal productivity: starting from a low capital base, the returns to investment were very high. Japan imported advanced technologies from abroad, adapted them, and combined them with its own strong base of human capital. Educational achievements of Japanese workers were already high even compared with economically advanced countries such as the U.S., so the workforce could absorb and utilize new methods quickly. In the language of growth theory, Japan had both the stock of human capital and the institutional framework for rapid technological adoption. The first major break in this rapid expansion came with the oil shocks of the 1970s. The quadrupling of oil prices in 1973 caused inflation and forced Japanese industries to restructure. Although Japan adapted relatively well by shifting to more energy-efficient production, the overall growth rate slowed. From 1973 to 1987, Japan's average annual growth was closer to 4 percent—still impressive by international standards, but less than half of what it had been during the rapid economic growth period. Several explanations for this slowdown have been proposed. An obvious one is the end of catch-up phase of economic growth: as Japan approached the technological frontier, it could no longer rely on simply importing and adapting foreign technologies. Productivity growth naturally decelerated as the scope for catch-up diminished. Yet even in this period, Japan was far from stagnating. The economy continued to expand, industries remained competitive internationally, and living standards continued to improve. However, the seeds of later problems were beginning to take root—particularly in the financial sector and in the structural rigidity of industries that resisted creative destruction. The expansion from 1986 to 1991, sometimes referred to as the "bubble economy," was one of the longest postwar upswings. Asset prices surged dramatically: the Nikkei 225 stock index tripled between 1985 and 1989, while urban land prices rose to unprecedented levels. This boom was fueled by a combination of loose monetary policy, speculative expectations, and financial liberalization that outpaced regulatory adaptation. Many observers at the time believed that Japan had entered a new growth stage. But in retrospect, it is clear that asset values far exceeded fundamentals. It was indeed a "bubble economy." Speculative bubbles always end up collapsing. The Japanese bubble was not an exception. Japanese asset...

Philippe Aghion Collège de France Économie des institutions, de l'innovation et de la croissance Année 2024-2025 Colloque - The Economics of Artificial Intelligence Chad Jones : A.I. and Economic Growth Chad Jones Stanford GSB

Philippe Aghion Collège de France Économie des institutions, de l'innovation et de la croissance Année 2024-2025 Colloque - The Economics of Artificial Intelligence Simon Bunel : How Different Uses of AI Shape Labor Demand: Evidence from France Simon Bunel Banque de France

Philippe Aghion Collège de France Économie des institutions, de l'innovation et de la croissance Année 2024-2025 Colloque - The Economics of Artificial Intelligence Flavio Calvino : AI, intangibles and productivity Flavio Calvino OECD

Philippe Aghion Collège de France Économie des institutions, de l'innovation et de la croissance Année 2024-2025 Colloque - The Economics of Artificial Intelligence Céline Antonin, Francesco Filippucci, Philine Widmer : Roundtable: The impact of AI for policy making Panelists: Céline Antonin (OFCE), Francesco Filippucci (OECD) and Philine Widmer (PSE) Moderator: Simon Bunel (Banque de France) Céline Antonin OFCE Francesco Filippucci OECD Philine Widmer PSE

Philippe Aghion Collège de France Économie des institutions, de l'innovation et de la croissance Année 2024-2025 Colloque - The Economics of Artificial Intelligence Ignazio Visco : Roundtable: The impact of AI for policy making – Opening remarks Ignazio Visco Governor Emeritus of Banca d'Italia

Philippe Aghion Collège de France Économie des institutions, de l'innovation et de la croissance Année 2024-2025 Colloque - The Economics of Artificial Intelligence Filipe Campante : AI Misinformation, Trust, and News Consumption Filipe Campante Johns Hopkins University

Philippe Aghion Collège de France Économie des institutions, de l'innovation et de la croissance Année 2024-2025 Colloque - The Economics of Artificial Intelligence Noam Yuchtman : Data, AI, and the State Noam Yuchtman Oxford

Philippe Aghion Collège de France Économie des institutions, de l'innovation et de la croissance Année 2024-2025 Colloque - The Economics of Artificial Intelligence Philippe Aghion : Should we fear A.I.? Philippe Aghion Professeur du Collège de France

Philippe Aghion Collège de France Économie des institutions, de l'innovation et de la croissance Année 2024-2025 Colloque - The Economics of Artificial Intelligence Roland Rathelot : How Can AI Improve Search and Matching? Evidence from 59 Million Personalized Job Recommendations Roland Rathelot CREST

Philippe Aghion Collège de France Économie des institutions, de l'innovation et de la croissance Année 2024-2025 Colloque - The Economics of Artificial Intelligence Eduard Talamas : The Turing Valley: How AI Capabilities Shape Labor Income Eduard Talamas IESE

Philippe Aghion Collège de France Économie des institutions, de l'innovation et de la croissance Année 2024-2025 Impulser une nouvelle croissance : IA et innovation verte 06 - Impulser une nouvelle croissance : IA et innovation verte - Faut-il craindre l'innovation en Chine ?