Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

What are the various methods through which individuals can engage in business transactions where payment or goods are exchanged upfront, with the agreement set at a fixed or reduced price? The Gemara delves into diverse scenarios, providing rulings on the permissibility, prohibition, or contentious nature of each. In some documented instances, Rabbis faced accusations of involvement in transactions resembling usury. Yet, on each occasion, they provided clarifications demonstrating why such actions did not constitute usury.

Today's daf is sponsored by Brooke & Yossi Pollak in honor of their daughter Avital Adin's bat mitzvah. "We are so proud of your devotion to Torah, mitzvot, and maasim tovim. Ima loves learning Mishna Yomi with you and can't wait to keep going for the next several years. Consistency, Consistency, Consistency! Mazal tov!" If a Jew lends money of a non-Jew to another Jew on interest, or if a non-Jew lends money of a Jew to a Jew, under which circumstances is it permissible? Ravina proposes a third explanation to elucidate the distinction in legal rulings between these scenarios, but his explanation is dismissed. If a convert engaged in borrowing or lending with interest prior to converting and then, before conversion, amalgamated the interest-bearing loan into one encompassing the entire sum, the convert is entitled to collect the full amount. Rabbi Yosi contends that if the convert was the borrower, the interest cannot be collected under any circumstances, as this might incentivize non-Jews to convert solely to evade high interest payments. The rabbis and Rabbi Meir debate whether a lender who loaned on interest can recover the principal amount only, without the interest, or if they are penalized and cannot recover any part of the loan. Various scenarios are examined where an aspect of the document is invalidated (akin to a loan involving interest), raising the question of whether the entire document becomes void or if the valid parts remain enforceable. Distinctions between different cases are analyzed, such as errors in a document versus situations where the document is based on false premises like the seller not actually owning the item being sold. The Mishna addresses the halachot concerning purchasing produce upfront at the start of the season but deferring receipt of the produce until later. This practice is often prohibited due to usury concerns, as the value of the produce may rise. It is permitted when the seller possesses the produce at the time of sale or when the market value has already been established.

Today's daf is sponsored by David and Mitzi Geffen in loving memory of David's father, Dr. Abraham Geffen, on his 9th yahrzeit. "The youngest of the 8 children of Rav Tuvia and Sara Hene Geffen of Atlanta, he was devoted to his wife Ethel, parents, siblings, children, extended family; and synagogue community of Beth El in New Rochelle, New York. He was a dedicated physician and served for years as the Director of Radiology at Beth Israel Medical Center in New York City." Today's daf is sponsored by Goldie Gilad in loving memory of her mother, Rivka Leah bat Sara on her 5th yahrzeit. "A woman of valor, a caring mother, a fighter and brave lone holocaust survivor who jumped out of a 2nd floor window to save herself from being attacked by Russian soldiers at the end of the war. Yehi zichra baruch." Can one loan on interest from non-Jews? Under what circumstances? A verse is brought to show that one who does not loan on interest or take bribes will retain their wealth, implying that those who loan on interest will lose their wealth. The Gemara questions that against reality where one sees righteous people who lose their money as well, grappling with the question of 'why do bad things happen to good people.' Rebbi raises two issues in verses from Vayikra Chapter 25, in a section related to people who become poor and those who get sold into slavery on account of their poverty. The Torah says that a Jewish slave can be sold to be a slave to a convert and that does not seem to match halakha. It also says that one cannot loan on interest to a ger toshav (one who keeps the seven Noahide laws) and it is permitted in our Mishna. They resolve both issues and explain the verses to match the halakha. A Jew can be a guarantor on a loan from a non-Jew to a Jew with interest. Why would this potentially be a problem and under what circumstances is it permitted? The Gemara explains the cases in the Mishna where a Jew loans money of a non-Jew to a Jew on interest. There are four possible cases - two of which are permitted and two are not. A question is raised based on the law that a Jew cannot be a messenger for a non-Jew and a non-Jew cannot be a messenger for a Jew. Three answers are given, however, the second one (two different versions of Rav Ashi's answer) is rejected.

Today's daf is sponsored by Rochelle Cheifetz in loving memory of her mother, Chana Cohen, Chana bat Moshe and Tzipora on her 3rd yahrzeit. "Your warmth and beauty created a bubble of caring around you and all you met. The hole of your absence feels irreparable. Tehi zichra baruch." Rav Papa's ruling allowed for paying rent and compensating for depreciation, akin to the practice of the sons of Kufra, backed by a braita cited in Bava Metzia 69b. Rav Anan, citing Shmuel, asserted that orphans could collect interest. However, Rav Nachman raised doubts, prompting further investigation. It turned out that Rav Anan had observed Shmuel renting out a kettle on behalf of orphans, collecting both rent and depreciation, which he mistakenly perceived as interest collection. Yet, this wasn't deemed as interest, even for non-orphans, given the significant depreciation incurred with each use of the kettle, warranting compensation for the loss. Orphans are permitted to invest in a manner where they enjoy profits without bearing losses. Raba, Rav Yosef, and Rav Ashi proposed various suggestions for managing orphan funds. Investing in a guaranteed investment with a Jew is prohibited, but permissible with a non-Jew. Does this imply that the guaranteed item invested is entirely in the recipient's domain? This notion conflicts with a Mishna concerning laws of firstborn animals. Abaye and Rava offered explanations, with Abaye's being dismissed. While it's permissible to charge interest on a loan with a non-Jew, is this practice viewed unfavorably?

How can individuals engage in profit-sharing investment arrangements without entangling themselves in collecting interest in a forbidden manner? The Gemara delves into this topic, explaining what type of compensation must the invertor pay for the venture. They examine real-life scenarios where such methods were employed. If someone invests an animal and it begets offspring, how and when should these offspring be divided? Furthermore, when one divides profits, how it is the process different when dealing with money as opposed to tangible assets like objects or animals? Regarding the rental of coins, the question arises whether such an arrangement constitutes a loan with interest. It is permissible to charge rent and adjust it based on additional investments made by the owner. However, laws governing rentals differ for items like stores or boats, and the reasons behind these differences are elucidated. Moreover, when renting an item, is it permissible to pay rent and assume responsibility for depreciation, or does this constitute interest?

Today's daf is dedicated in commemoration of Yom HaShoah, in memory of all those who perished in the Holocaust. Rava mentions three common business practices that he forbade due to usury concerns. What considerations should one bear in mind when entering into a profit-sharing investment arrangement with another individual to steer clear of usury? Besides both parties assuming responsibility for their respective roles, the investing party must compensate the other for their labor to prevent receiving undue benefit, akin to taking interest. How should this compensation be determined? There are various opinions on this matter.

Today's daf is sponsored by Caroline Ben-Ari in honour of her father, Ivor Rhodes, ישראל בן מאיר ושרה, on his 14th yahrzeit. "Dad was a quiet, undemonstrative man who had a deep love for his family, strong values, and unimpeachable integrity. He also had a wicked sense of humour and was the King of the Puns. All Dad jokes and bad puns sent to me today will be greatly appreciated." Rav Nachman believed that forgiveness (mechila) by mistake in a sale is considered forgiveness. Rava challenged him from the law of ona'ah (overcharging), but Rav Nachman responded to him from the law of aylonit. But in truth, ona'ah cannot serve as a difficulty and aylonit cannot serve as an answer because these two cases are not similar to the case Rav Nachman was dealing with regarding forgiveness. When a lender takes land as collateral, if the lender consumed its fruits as interest, is the lender obligated to return the fruits? Is there a way to consume the fruits and it will not be considered interest? The Gemara distinguishes between places where it is customary that the borrower can remove the lender from the land at any point (if the money is returned) and places where the borrower cannot remove the lender until the time stipulated in the loan. https://youtu.be/aJWVVdLnvuk

In cases where someone makes an exaggerated commitment during or after a transaction, is this commitment deemed valid? Is it assumed that the person never truly intended to commit and was merely making statements to bolster confidence? Various instances are presented concerning such declarations and their effectiveness in legal contexts.

Today's daf is sponsored by Judy and Jerel Shapiro for the yahrzeits of Arnold Shapiro, Jerel's father z”l, and their grandson Edan Shai, z”l. And in honor of the birth just before Pesach of their new granddaughter in Kiryat Tivon, Israel, whose name is Tohar Libi. If a lender collects interest, Rabbi Elazar asserts that the court can compel the lender to return the money. Various scenarios are presented where the interest collected deviates from the agreed terms. In each instance, the question arises: should the lender return what was originally agreed upon or what was actually received? Concerning the practice of offering different prices for upfront versus deferred payments in transactions such as renting or buying a house, the Mishna delineates that while it is permissible for rentals, it is prohibited in sales. This discrepancy stems from the nature of rental charges, which are incurred only at the end of the agreed period, thus avoiding issues of benefiting from delayed payments. In contrast, in a sale, payment obligations arise at the time of the transaction. Rav Nachman, Rav Papa, and Rav Chama each attempt to justify their business practice of imposing higher rates on deferred payments. If land is sold with a partial payment upfront and a commitment to pay the remainder later, who is entitled to the produce during the interim period before full payment? A braita provides four potential resolutions based on the initial terms of the sale. After expounding on these cases, Rav Huna, son of Rabbi Yehoshua, contends that the braita does not align with the stance of Rabbi Yehuda, who permits interest if it's not explicitly defined from the outset. Furthermore, Rav Huna identifies two additional cases that diverge from Rabbi Yehuda's position.

Today’s daf is dedicated by the Hadran Women of Long Island in honor of the birth of twin grandsons to our friend and co-learner Cindy Dolgin. "May the parents, Maya Dolgin and Or Shaked, as well as the extended family and the entire Jewish people see much nachat from the new arrivals, and may they be a source of blessing to all. תזכו לגדלם לתורה לחופה ולמעשים טובים!" Today’s daf is sponsored by the Hadran zoom family in celebration of our friend, Adina Hagege, and her husband, Eric, becoming grandparents. "May Shahari Moshe grow up surrounded with love and peace, and may he bring his grandparents much joy." If someone lends coins to another person, or returns a loan of coins, and the recipient discovers more coins than originally agreed upon, the question arises: must they return the surplus, or can it be presumed that the excess was intended as a gift? This hinges on various factors. When small gourds are typically sold at ten for a zuz, and a seller undertakes to provide the buyer with ten large gourds for a zuz, Rav ruled that this arrangement is permissible only if the seller possessed large gourds at the time of the transaction. However, some argue that Rava dissented, allowing it even if the seller didn't currently have large gourds, since small gourds naturally mature into larger ones. Comparatively, how does this scenario differ from selling milk to be milked from a goat, wool to be sheared from a sheep, or honey to be harvested from a hive? Abaye maintains that one can pre-purchase wine at a set price, even if the seller assumes the risk of the wine turning into vinegar, provided the buyer agrees that a decrease in value won't alter the price. One who has lent money cannot reside in the borrower's house for free or at a discounted rate, as it resembles usury. Rav Yosef bar Manyumi, citing Rav Nachman, extends this prohibition even to a house that the borrower isn't utilizing or leasing. However, there is a different version of Rav Nachman's statement, forbidding it only if the rental arrangement is connected with the loan agreement. In another case, Rav Yosef bar Chama would seize the slaves of his debtors, employing them for his benefit. His son Rava raised concerns about this practice, citing the lack of compensation for their labor and the appearance of engaging in usury. While Rav Yosef initially justified his actions, he eventually ceased the practice due to the latter concern.

Today’s daf is sponsored by the Hadran Women of Long Island in loving memory of Joan Behrmann a”h, beloved mother of our friend and co-learner Marcy Behrmann Farrell. "Marcy’s passion for truth and equity has deep roots, and we daven that our learning will serve as a merit for the entire family. המקום ינחם אותם בתוך שאר אבלי ציון וירושלים." After two failed attempts at understanding the case in the Mishna where interest is forbidden by rabbinic law, Rava brings an explanation according to Rabbi Oshaya's braita and according to Rabbi Yannai's opinion - that one can turn a loan of money into a loan of produce. If the borrower has the item in his/her possession, even if the price goes up, there is no concern for interest. Rav disagrees with Rabbi Yannai and holds that one cannot turn a loan for an item into the value of that item and return the value in money as it appears like interest. How can Rav explain the braita of Rabbi Oshaya per his opinion? Two explanations are given - either the braita is referring to a case where the borrower designated a corner and placed the produce there or it follows the unique opinion of Rabbi Yehuda that a transaction where there is potential for interest but it is not clear that there will be an interest payment is permitted, as perhaps maybe prices will stay the same or go down and the lender will not receive more. Rava infers from Rabbi Yannai's position why it is permitted to pay in advance for produce and receive it later, even if the seller does not have it yet in his/her possession. Since the seller has the money and could potentially buy produce with that money, it is considered as if the seller has the produce. This, however, would only work in a sale, not a loan. Rabba and Rav Yosef give a different reason why this kind of sale works even if the price goes up and the buyer will receive produce later at a higher value. The benefit of receiving produce at a higher value is not a benefit as the buyer can say, "If I hadn't given the money to the seller (to receive the produce at a later date), I could have bought the produce from a different seller at the time and they would have increased in value in my possession." Two difficulties are raised with Rabba and Rav Yosef. Why wouldn't this argument permit loaning a seah of grain for a seah of grain? Isn't it a benefit to the buyer that there was no extra payment for a middleman? Both difficulties are resolved. Rabba and Rav Yosef require a buyer who pays in advance to receive produce later, at the current rate, to meet the seller on the threshing floor. For what purpose? Rav Nachman teaches that any case of getting payment for waiting is considered interest and he brings an example of one who discounts a price for receiving the money upfront. This would be permitted only if the seller has the items in his/her possession.

Today's daf is sponsored by Yechiel Berkowicz in loving memory of his mother Sara F. Berkowicz. "She was a holocaust survivor and strong supporter of Jewish education." Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elazar engage in a debate over whether the court holds the authority to compel the return of interest payments collected at a fixed rate from the outset. Rabbi Eliezer supports his stance by referencing a verse from Vayikra 22:27, which concludes with "and your brother shall live with you," suggesting that one should return the interest to foster a harmonious relation with the borrower. However, Rabbi Yochanan interprets this verse differently, aligning it with Rabbi Akiva's opinion in his dispute with Ben Petura regarding the scenario of two individuals traveling with only one canteen of water. In this dilemma, where the water is insufficient for both to survive, is it preferable for each to consume half and neither will cause the death of the other, or for the canteen owner to drink it all and survive. Two sources are cited to challenge Rabbi Yochanan's view that the court lacks the authority to enforce the lender to return the interest collected. These objections are somewhat reconciled to support Rabbi Yochanan's position. Rav Safra, aligning with Rabbi Elazar, delineates between interest payments that the court can compel the lender to return and those that they cannot. Although Abaye and Ravina initially raise objections to Rav Safra's distinction, these concerns are eventually resolved. The initial Mishna of the chapter presents a case of interest prohibited by the rabbis. However, it conflicts with a subsequent Mishna within the same chapter. Raba and Abaye propose interpretations of the case details, but their explanations are ultimately rejected.

What is the source indicating that both the borrower and lender are prohibited from borrowing or lending on interest? Why did the Torah find it necessary to delineate separate negative commandments for interest, theft, and exploitation (ona’ah), rather than deriving one from the other, considering their similarities in taking what isn't rightfully theirs? Furthermore, why does the Torah mention the Exodus from Egypt in verses concerning interest, tzitzit, and using fair measurements in business? Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elazar debate whether the court can compel individuals who have collected interest at a fixed rate from the outset (ribit k’tzutza) to return the interest payments they received.

What practices are permissible in conducting an ethical business? Can one commingle produce from various fields or dilute wine before selling it? What criteria determine what is allowed or prohibited? What tactics are deemed acceptable or forbidden in a competitive commercial environment? Different rabbis offer varying perspectives on these questions. The fifth chapter delves into the laws of interest. The Mishna initiates the discussion by delineating what is interest that is prohibited by Torah law and by rabbinic law. The Gemara elucidates the terminology used in the Torah - neshech (interest causing a loss for the borrower) and marbit (interest generating gain for the lender) - and elucidates that both terms signify the existence of two negative commandments concerning lending or borrowing money with interest that both apply in all cases.

It is regarded as a grave transgression to humiliate another person. Some emphasize the prohibition against verbally abusing one's spouse, noting that maintaining food (financial stability) in the household is advisable to preserve harmony. While many prayers may not always find immediate acceptance, the prayers of those who have suffered verbal abuse will always be heard, and God will punish the perpetrators. The story of the oven of Achnai illustrates the potency of prayers from those who have endured verbal abuse. Rabbi Eliezer, who stood against the majority opinion of the rabbis and was subsequently excommunicated and mistreated, serves as a prime example. Despite presenting miraculous signs and even a heavenly voice affirming the correctness of his stance, Rabbi Yehoshua asserted, "It is not in heaven." This narrative underscores the authority of the rabbinic system to establish its own truths, even if they diverge from the absolute truth of God. However, mentioning this story in this context highlights the impact of words and how the mistreatment of Rabbi Eliezer ultimately led to the death of Rabban Gamliel through his prayers. The prohibition against abusing converts is emphasized, with the Torah warning against it in thirty-six (or forty-six) instances. This underscores the severity of the offense and the importance of treating converts with respect and dignity.

The Mishna established that in cases involving hekdesh (sanctified property), a shomer who watches for free is exempt from taking an oath, while a paid shomer is exempt from liability in cases of theft or loss. However, there are tannaitic sources that appear to contradict the Mishna, prompting various proposed resolutions. Rabbi Shimon distinguishes between different categories of sanctified items, arguing that some are subject to exploitation laws. Rabbi Yehuda excludes specific items from exploitation laws altogether. The Gemara elucidates both positions. The Mishna asserts that alongside the Torah prohibition against exploitation in monetary matters, there exists a Torah injunction against verbal abuse. Various examples are cited to underscore the severity of this offense, highlighting its gravity in Jewish law.

Although certain categories are exempt from exploitation laws, does this exemption extend to cases where one party exploits another at a higher rate (bitul mekach)? Rabbi Yona and Rabbi Yirmia each offer different answers in the name of Rabbi Yochanan. A challenge is posed to Rabbi Yirmia's position based on another statement attributed to Rabbi Yochanan. Several proposed explanations are offered to reconcile this discrepancy. Additionally, the derivations for the exclusion of these categories in other Mishnaic laws, such as double payment and laws governing the responsibilities of shomrim, are explored.

Different rabbis offer an opinion about whether or not Rabbi Meir believes that the rabbis made rabbinic laws stringent like Torah laws. They cite various sources to support their positions. Abaye analyzes the comments of the different rabbis, arguing that different levels of rabbinic laws exist, including those punishable by human courts, divine punishment, and negative prohibitions. Thus, he contends that comparing these various levels to prove Rabbi Meir's stance is flawed. The Mishna enumerates specific categories exempt from the general laws of ona’ah, such as land, slaves, documents, and sanctified items. Similarly, laws concerning double payment and the responsibilities of shomrim do not apply to these categories. Additional distinctions are made by other tannaim, expanding the list further. The exceptions to ona’ah are derived from specific passages in the Torah.

If one misuses consecrated property unknowingly, one must repay the value and add one-fifth (chomesh). Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi held that the additional one-fifth payment is not added if one is redeeming a secondary hekdesh, an item that was sanctified from an item that was already sanctified (via hatpasa). The Gemara questions a statement made in a braita that was brought to support Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi and resolves it. Another braita is brought as support for Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi. The Mishna lists the minimum amount of money for ona’ah and partial admission (modeh b’miktzat). It also lists five laws for which the minimum amount is a pruta. Levi has a different list of the five laws and the Gemara discusses why each list differs from the other. The Mishna lists 5 cases where one needs to add one fifth. One of the items is d’mai – a case where there is reason to think that ma’asrot (tithes) may not have been taken and the rabbis required one to separate the tithes just in case. Rabbi Elazar questions why the Mishna lists that one would add one-fifth if a non-kohen ate truma taken from d’mai, which is only truma by rabbinic law. Why would it be treated as stringently as a Torah obligation? They answer that the Mishna is according to Rabbi Meir’s approach that the rabbis make their decrees as strong as the Torah as is proven from a case of divorce law where Rabbi Meir is stringent. However, they raise a difficulty with saying that this is Rabbi Meir’s position.

Today's daf is sponsored by Lori Stark in loving memory of her mother in law, Sara Shapiro and her father Nehemiah Sosewitz. "Sara proudly shared that her father taught her some Talmud at a time when that was not done. He came to Chicago from Stashov Poland and was known for delivering the laundry along with a dvar Torah. Sara was a highly respected Jewish educator in Chicago. May both their memories be for a blessing." Today's daf is sponsored by the Hadran women of Long Island in honor of the birth of a grandson to our friend and co-learner Leah Brick. "May the entire family be zoche to raise him לתורה ולחופה ולמעשים טובים and may this simcha be one of many we will celebrate together." When redeeming maaser sheni, the owner must add one-fifth more than the value of the produce. Is this one-fifth of the principal or one-fifth of the total once the one-fifth is added (1/4 of the principal)? After proving it is 1/4 from a tannatic source, a braita is quoted showing there is a tannaitic debate on how to calculate the one-fifth. If one does not add the one-fifth, is the produce considered redeemed? After answering this question from a tannaitic source proving that the one-fifth is not essential and the produce can be considered redeemed even without the one-fifth, the Gemara suggests that perhaps it is a tannaitic debate. However, this suggestion is rejected as all agree it is not essential but the rabbis deliberate about whether or not one can eat the produce by rabbinic law if the one-fifth has not been added as a way to prevent negligence. Regarding redeeming hekdesh, sanctified items, there is no concern for negligence as the treasurers collect the one-fifth payment. It is still not considered redeemed until one-fifth is added, but if it were Shabbat, one could eat the hekdesh item on account of the mitzva of oneg Shabbat. Rami bar Hama lists three rules relating to one-fifth payment in hekdesh, truma and maaser - do the same rules apply to the one-fifth payment as for the principal - if hekdesh, can it be redeemed on land, if for truma that one stole, does it need to be paid in produce, and if for maaser, can it be redeemed on an asimon? One who stole and denied it or a non-kohen who ate truma, can potentially pay one-fifth on a one-fifth payment. Is the same true for maaser and hekdesh? Is there a connection between this issue and the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi that the additional one-fifth payment is not added if one is redeeming a secondary hekdesh, an item that was sanctified from an item that was already sanctified (via hatpasa)?