Supreme Court of Canada Hearings (English Audio)

Appellants TransAlta Generation Partnership and TransAlta Generation (Keephills 3) (collectively, “TransAlta”) own coal-fired electrical power generation facilities in Alberta. The value of those properties is assessed as “linear property” for municipal taxation purposes. The Municipal Government Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. M-26, defines the term “linear property” and authorizes the Minister of Municipal Affairs to establish guidelines for assessing its value. In 2016, TransAlta entered into off-coal agreements with the province pursuant to which they agreed to cease coal-fired emissions by December 31, 2030; in exchange, the province agreed to pay TransAlta substantial sums annually for 14 years. On December 19, 2017, the Minister established the 2017 Alberta Linear Property Assessment Minister’s Guidelines (the “Linear Guidelines”), which set out the procedure for calculating all linear property assessments. The Linear Guidelines do not allow for off-coal agreements to be considered in assessing depreciation. TransAlta applied for judicial review which, among other things, challenged provisions of the Linear Guidelines that prevented the off-coal agreements from being considered in the assessment of depreciation as being ultra vires. The application judge found that the Linear Guidelines, including the impugned provisions, were within the Minister’s authority and lawfully enacted. She dismissed the application for judicial review. The Court of Appeal dismissed TransAlta’s appeal. Argued Date 2024-04-25 Keywords Administrative law — Judicial review — Whether 2017 Alberta Linear Property Assessment Minister’s Guidelines discriminate without statutory authority — Either way, whether they are consistent with intent of Municipal Government Act, as required by s. 322(1)(i) — What standard of review applies — Municipal Government Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. M-26, ss. 322, 322.1. Notes (Alberta) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent, Pekuakamiulnuatsh Takuhikan, is a band council within the meaning of the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5. It represents the Pekuakamiulnuatsh Innu First Nation, whose community is located in Mashteuiatsh on the western shore of Lac Saint-Jean near Roberval. Under tripartite agreements signed over the years with the Government of Canada and the Government of Quebec since 1996, the respondent is responsible for policing in the community of Mashteuiatsh. The tripartite agreements resulted from the adoption by the Government of Canada in 1991 of the First Nations Policing Policy and the First Nations Policing Program, which allowed it and the provinces, territories and First Nations to negotiate tripartite funding agreements in order to establish professional police services responsive to the needs and culture of each Indigenous community. The respondent brought an action against the Government of Canada, represented by the intervener, the Attorney General of Canada, and the Government of Quebec, represented by the appellant, the Attorney General of Quebec, claiming [translation] “reimbursement of the accumulated deficits of Public Security in the community of Mashteuiatsh for the services provided under the agreements on policing in the community of Mashteuiatsh in force for the period of April 1, 2013, to the present date”. It seems that the governments continued renewing the tripartite agreements without increasing the money allotted, despite the fact that the respondent had to pay significant amounts retroactively to the members of its police force as a result of an arbitration award, related to the renewal of the collective agreement, that ordered catch-up wage increases for the period of 2009 to 2014. In support of its application, the respondent alleged that the Government of Quebec and the Government of Canada had breached their obligations to negotiate in good faith, to act with honour and to fulfill their fiduciary duties toward it with respect to the funding of its police force. Argued Date 2024-04-24 Keywords Aboriginal law — Self-government — Contracts — Honour of the Crown — Tripartite agreement between federal government, Government of Quebec and band council of Pekuakamiulnuatsh Innu First Nation concerning funding for Indigenous police force — Whether constitutional principle of honour of Crown applies in relation to agreements entered into under s. 90 of Police Act, CQLR, c. P-13.1 — In alternative, whether Quebec breached its duty to act honourably — In alternative, how principle of honour of Crown fits into general law rules of civil liability in Quebec, and whether, in this case, it can ground finding of abuse of rights as made by Court of Appeal — Police Act, CQLR, c. P-13.1, ss. 48, 90, 91 and 93 — Civil Code of Québec, arts. 6, 7, 1372, 1375, 1376, 1377, 1378, 1433, 1434 and 1458. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent, Pekuakamiulnuatsh Takuhikan, is a band council within the meaning of the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5. It represents the Pekuakamiulnuatsh Innu First Nation, whose community is located in Mashteuiatsh on the western shore of Lac Saint-Jean near Roberval. Under tripartite agreements signed over the years with the Government of Canada and the Government of Quebec since 1996, the respondent is responsible for policing in the community of Mashteuiatsh. The tripartite agreements resulted from the adoption by the Government of Canada in 1991 of the First Nations Policing Policy and the First Nations Policing Program, which allowed it and the provinces, territories and First Nations to negotiate tripartite funding agreements in order to establish professional police services responsive to the needs and culture of each Indigenous community. The respondent brought an action against the Government of Canada, represented by the intervener, the Attorney General of Canada, and the Government of Quebec, represented by the appellant, the Attorney General of Quebec, claiming [translation] “reimbursement of the accumulated deficits of Public Security in the community of Mashteuiatsh for the services provided under the agreements on policing in the community of Mashteuiatsh in force for the period of April 1, 2013, to the present date”. It seems that the governments continued renewing the tripartite agreements without increasing the money allotted, despite the fact that the respondent had to pay significant amounts retroactively to the members of its police force as a result of an arbitration award, related to the renewal of the collective agreement, that ordered catch-up wage increases for the period of 2009 to 2014. In support of its application, the respondent alleged that the Government of Quebec and the Government of Canada had breached their obligations to negotiate in good faith, to act with honour and to fulfill their fiduciary duties toward it with respect to the funding of its police force. Argued Date 2024-04-23 Keywords Aboriginal law — Self-government — Contracts — Honour of the Crown — Tripartite agreement between federal government, Government of Quebec and band council of Pekuakamiulnuatsh Innu First Nation concerning funding for Indigenous police force — Whether constitutional principle of honour of Crown applies in relation to agreements entered into under s. 90 of Police Act, CQLR, c. P-13.1 — In alternative, whether Quebec breached its duty to act honourably — In alternative, how principle of honour of Crown fits into general law rules of civil liability in Quebec, and whether, in this case, it can ground finding of abuse of rights as made by Court of Appeal — Police Act, CQLR, c. P-13.1, ss. 48, 90, 91 and 93 — Civil Code of Québec, arts. 6, 7, 1372, 1375, 1376, 1377, 1378, 1433, 1434 and 1458. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE) The respondent, T.J.F., was charged with human trafficking and obtaining a financial or material benefit from human trafficking during a period from 2006 through 2011. The trial judge accepted that the respondent had engaged in threats, intimidation and injury towards the complainant; he characterized this as “past discreditable conduct” but not part of the actus reus of the offences alleged. The complainant testimony included evidence of exploitation and attempted exploitation, but the trial judge did not accept the complainant’s evidence due to issues with her credibility. The respondent was acquitted. On appeal by the Crown, a majority of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal agreed that the trial judge erred in treating the respondent’s violent conduct as “past discreditable conduct,” but it held that the error had no impact on the acquittal because exploitation and attempted exploitation depended upon the complainant’s testimony which the judge did not accept. The appeal was therefore dismissed. The dissenting judge would have held that the trial judge erred in law by misapprehending critical evidence and also concluded that the Crown would have been able to rely on the evidentiary presumption in s. 279.01(3), which was enacted in 2019. The dissenting judge concluded that there is a reasonable degree of certainty the verdict would not have been the same but for the judge’s error. She would have allowed the appeal, set aside the acquittals and ordered a new trial. Argued Date 2024-03-27 Keywords Criminal Law — Offences — Evidence — Trafficking and obtaining financial or material benefit from trafficking — Credibility — Evidentiary presumption — Temporal application — Whether the trial judge’s erroneous characterization of the respondent’s violent conduct as “past discreditable conduct” rather than part of the actus reus raised a reasonable certainty that the verdict would not have been the same but for the error — Whether the evidentiary presumption in section 279.01(3) of the Criminal Code would be triggered in this case — Whether the evidentiary presumption in section 279.01(3) of the Criminal Code would apply retrospectively — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 279.01, 279.02, 279.04. Notes (Nova Scotia) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

After consuming alcohol, Mr. Wolfe drove his vehicle on the wrong side of a divided highway for a considerable distance at night. He caused a head-on collision that seriously injured Mrs. Niazi and killed her husband and daughter. Mr. Wolfe was convicted on two counts of criminally negligent operation of a motor vehicle causing death under s. 220(b) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, and on one count of criminally negligent operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm under s. 221 of the Criminal Code. He was sentenced to three concurrent terms of incarceration with a global term of six years. The sentencing judge additionally ordered a driving prohibition for 10 years for each count of criminal negligence causing death and a driving prohibition for 7 years for the count of criminal negligence causing bodily harm. The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal from the sentence. Argued Date 2024-03-26 Keywords Criminal law — Sentencing — Driving prohibition — Can a driving prohibition be imposed following conviction for criminal negligence causing death through the operation of a conveyance or criminal negligence causing bodily harm through the operation of a conveyance? Notes (Saskatchewan) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

This case involves a challenge to the validity of regulations adopted by the Agency to compensate air passengers for various delays, losses and inconveniences experienced in the course of international air travel. Parliament adopted the Transportation Modernization Act, S.C. 2018, c. 10 (“TMA”), which amended the CTA by creating the new s. 86.11. This new provision requires the Agency, after consulting with the Minister of Transport, to make regulations imposing certain obligations on air carriers, notably in relation to flight delays, flight cancellations, denial of boarding, and loss of or damage to baggage. Pursuant to s. 86.11(2) of the CTA, the Minister issued the Direction Respecting Tarmac Delays of Three Hours or Less, S.O.R./2019-110 (the Direction) requiring the Agency to adopt regulations imposing obligations on air carriers to provide timely information and assistance to passengers in cases of tarmac delays of three hours or less. Around the same time, the Agency adopted the Regulations, imposing obligations, including liability, on air carriers with respect to tarmac delays, flight cancellations, flight delays, denial of boarding and damage or loss of baggage in the context of domestic and international air travel. The appellant airlines challenged numerous provisions of the new Regulations on the basis that they exceed the Agency’s authority under the CTA. They claim that the Regulations contravene Canada’s international obligations, in particular the Montreal Convention and many of the Regulations’ provisions are ultra vires because they have impermissible extraterritorial effects, which violate fundamental notions of international law. These matters went directly to the Federal Court of Appeal. It dismissed the appeal, except with respect to s. 23(2) of the Regulations which it found ultra vires of the CTA (this section deals with liability for temporary loss of baggage). Argued Date 2024-03-25 Keywords Transportation law — Air transport — Validity of Air Passenger Protection Regulations, SOR/2019-150 (“Regulations”) adopted by Canadian Transportation Agency (“Agency”) to compensate air passengers for various delays, losses and inconveniences experienced in course of international air travel — Whether liability provisions of Regulations, when applied to international carriage by air, are inconsistent with Canada’s obligations under Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air (“Montreal Convention”), and ultra vires Agency’s regulation-making power under s. 86.11 of Canada Transportation Act, S.C. 1996, c. 10 (“CTA”), and therefore invalid — Whether Federal Court of Appeal erred by deciding that expert evidence on issues of international law is inadmissible as a matter of law, and by striking those parts of appellants’ expert evidence addressing whether “state practice” relied upon by Attorney General of Canada (“AGC”) is “in the application of”, and consistent with Montreal Convention? Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Police seized a cellphone during a search incident to the arrest of a known drug dealer. The phone was displaying incoming text messages on its screen. The police believed the messages revealed a transaction for heroin, which would likely be laced with fentanyl, was in progress. The police impersonated the drug dealer by responding to the text messages, and arranged to have the drugs delivered to the dealer’s residence. Applicant Dwayne Alexander Campbell arrived at the residence and was arrested. Mr. Campbell was charged under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA). At trial, Mr. Campbell brought a motion to exclude evidence, claiming that his rights under s. 8 of the Charter had been infringed by the police action in using the dealer’s phone to communicate with him. The trial judge rejected Mr. Campbell’s claim that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages, and concluded that the likelihood that the drugs were laced with fentanyl created exigent circumstances that justified the warrantless use of the drug dealer’s cellphone. Mr. Campbell was convicted and sentenced. The Court of Appeal held that Mr. Campbell did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his electronic communications, but that the police action was justified by the exigent circumstances doctrine. Consequently, there was no breach of Mr. Campbell’s s. 8 rights. The Court of Appeal dismissed Mr. Campbell’s appeal. Argued Date 2024-03-21 Keywords Charter of Rights — Search and seizure (s. 8) — Enforcement (s. 24) — Exigent circumstances — Police seizing cellphone in search incident to the arrest of a known drug dealer — Incoming text messages from appellant visible on its screen — Police believing messages concerned impending drug deal involving fentanyl — Police impersonating drug dealer, facilitating drug transaction with the appellant via text message — Whether police breached appellant’s s. 8 rights by warrantless use of drug dealer’s cellphone to impersonate drug dealer and engage in electronic conversation with accused — Whether police action justified by exigent circumstances because the police reasonably believed the drug transaction may have involved fentanyl — Whether police breached the appellant’s s. 8 rights by intercepting private communications without authorization — Whether evidence obtained by s. 8 breaches should have been excluded — Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19, s. 11; Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, Part VI Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Following a trial in the Court of Québec, the appellant, Gabriel Boudreau, was convicted of dangerous driving causing bodily harm as a result of a collision between him and the complainant. On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge had erred by finding that he had taken part in a race with another driver, by improperly assessing the complainant’s testimony and by failing to consider some of the evidence. The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, as it was of the view that the verdict was not unreasonable, illogical or irrational. The trial judge, who had direct evidence on some aspects and circumstantial evidence on others, could convict the appellant of the offence based on that evidence. The dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and ordered a new trial. In her view, the trial judge had made two errors that undermined the reasonableness of the verdict. She had rejected the testimony on the basis of an illogical inference even though the appellant’s version was consistent with the site of the damage and was confirmed by the complainant’s testimony. In addition, the judge’s finding that the complainant had been driving in the left lane well before the impact was contradicted by the complainant’s testimony. Argued Date 2024-03-20 Keywords Criminal law — Appeals — Unreasonable verdict — Evidence — Whether trial judge arrived at unreasonable verdict by drawing illogical inferences and by drawing inferences that were clearly contradicted by evidence. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant, Trevor Ian James Lindsay, is a constable with the Calgary Police Service. While processing an arrestee, an altercation occurred between the appellant and the arrestee that left the latter with serious injuries. The appellant was charged with aggravated assault under s. 268 of the Criminal Code. At trial, the appellant’s defence included s. 25 of the Criminal Code, which protects peace officers from liability related to their lawful use of force. The trial judge concluded that s. 25 did not protect the appellant from criminal liability for his actions. A majority of the Court of Appeal agreed. However, Wakeling J.A., in dissent, would have held that the trial judge erred in concluding that the prosecution had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant’s actions constituted an assault, and also that the trial judge erred in concluding that s. 25 did not apply. Wakeling J.A. would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial. Argued Date 2023-12-14 Keywords Criminal Law — Defences — Use of force by peace officer — Protection of peace officers — Whether the majority of the Court of Appeal of Alberta erred in upholding the trial judge’s decision that s. 25 of the Criminal Code did not protect the appellant from criminal liability — Whether the majority of the Court of the Appeal erred in upholding the trial judge’s decision that the prosecution had proven the elements of aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt — Criminal Code, s. 25. Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant engaged in a sexual encounter with two other men in a park. A number of hours later, the body of one of those men was found in the park; he had died due to external neck compression. The appellant had mental health difficulties and had consumed both psychiatric medication and alcohol around the time he was in the park with the victim and the third man. The appellant had made several statements both before and after the victim’s death that he wanted to harm and kill gay men, and that he had at times carried a rope and a knife to do so. In the days following the killing, the appellant searched the internet for news with respect to the discovery of a body in the park. A jury found the appellant guilty of first-degree murder. A majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal and held that the trial judge’s instructions to the jury had been appropriate. In dissent, Nordheimer J.A. would have allowed the appeal on two grounds: (1) that the trial judge failed to instruct the jury on the appellant’s mental health as it relates to the intent required for murder and (2) that the trial judge failed to provide a limiting instruction on the use of after-the-fact conduct evidence. Nordheimer J.A. would have ordered a new trial. Argued Date 2023-12-15 Keywords Criminal law — Charge to jury — Non-direction amounting to misdirection — Need to review mental health evidence with jury — Need to include limiting instruction for after-the-fact conduct evidence — Whether Court of Appeal erred by holding that trial judge did not err in not relating mental health evidence to intent required for murder — Whether the Court of Appeal erred by holding that the trial judge did not err in not providing a limiting instruction for after-the-fact conduct evidence Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE) The appellant, a police officer, was temporarily off work because of medical problems. During a meeting with a physician-arbitrator who was to determine whether his disability was permanent, the appellant misrepresented his work activities with his former spouse’s travel agencies. The physician-arbitrator found that his disability was permanent, and the appellant was therefore entitled to permanent disability benefits from his employer. The employer knew of some of the appellant’s work activities but did not tell the physician-arbitrator about them. The trial judge found that all the elements of the offence of fraud over $5,000 had been established. The appellant was convicted of one count of fraud. The majority of the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s decision, while the minority would have substituted a verdict of attempted fraud. Argued Date 2024-01-17 Keywords Criminal law — Offences — Elements of offence — Fraud — Deprivation — Concurrence between actus reus and mens rea — Proof of causation — Whether Court has jurisdiction to hear appeal as of right under s. 691(1)(a) of Criminal Code — Whether majority of Court of Appeal interpreted essential element of deprivation too broadly — Whether victim’s prior knowledge of scheme prevents deprivation from being shown — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 380(1). Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Appellant Daniel Hodgson was charged with second-degree murder following a death at a house party. The victim, a large man, had become aggressive towards the house owner and refused to leave. Mr. Hodgson, who had been sleeping in a nearby bedroom, was asked by a guest to help remove the victim from the house. The victim died after Mr. Hodgson applied a one-arm choke hold on him. Mr. Hodgson was acquitted at trial. The trial judge had a reasonable doubt as to whether Mr. Hodgson had the requisite intent for murder. On the lesser included offence of manslaughter, the trial judge concluded that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Hodgson did not act in self-defence pursuant to s. 34 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial. Argued Date 2024-02-15 Keywords Criminal Law — Defences — Self-Defence — Appellant charged with second-degree murder following an altercation at party — Trial judge finding no intent to murder, and Crown failing to disprove self-defence on the lesser included offence of manslaughter — Appellant acquitted — Court of Appeal setting aside acquittal and ordering new trial — Whether Court of Appeal exceeded its jurisdiction in concluding that the trial judge’s failure to infer intent for murder was a reviewable legal error — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in concluding that the trial judge was required to infer the intent for murder — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in concluding that the trial judge erroneously approached the issue of the reasonableness of the Appellant’s response from a purely subjective perspective — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 34. Notes (Nunavut) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(Publication ban in case) In the Court Martial, a military judge acquitted the respondent, Private D.T. Vu, of sexual assault under s. 130 of the National Defence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-5 (“NDA”), that is to say, s. 271 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. It is alleged that the respondent performed a sex act on the complainant who was incapable of consenting to the act by reason of advanced intoxication. The judge concluded that the Crown did not prove part of the actus reus (being a lack of subjective consent) beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellant Crown appealed to the Court Martial Appeal Court. It submitted that the military judge erred in finding that the prosecution failed to prove a lack of consent or capacity to consent. Its submission rested on the proposition recognized in R. v. J.M.H., 2011 SCC 45, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 197, that the judge committed a legal error by failing to consider the entirety and cumulative effect of the evidence in reaching his conclusion on the issue. A majority of the appeal court (per Bell C.J. and Trotter J.A.) dismissed the appeal. It held the military judge did not err in law in his analysis leading to the respondent’s acquittal. Any findings the military judge made that the majority took issue with were held to have no bearing on the verdict reached. The majority further held that in the event it was incorrect on this point, it would rely upon s. 241 of the NDA, which states that “[n]otwithstanding anything in this Division, the Court Martial Appeal Court may disallow an appeal if, in the opinion of the Court, to be expressed in writing, there has been no substantial miscarriage of justice”. In dissent, McVeigh J.A. would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial. In her view, the military judge erred in law by failing to consider all of the evidence cumulatively, which led him to speculate improperly about alternative theories. These errors might have reasonably had a material bearing on the verdict. Further, the military judge erred by relying on improper inferences which, in effect, amounted to an insistence that the complainant’s intoxication had to be corroborated beyond the available evidence in this case. Argued Date 2024-01-16 Keywords Criminal law — Armed forces — Military Offences —Sexual Assault — Evidence — Whether the military judge failed to consider all of the evidence cumulatively — Whether the military judge assessed the evidence based on the wrong legal principles. Notes (Federal) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

After a trial in the Court of Québec, the appellant, Yves Caleb Jr. Charles, was convicted of assault with a weapon, using an imitation firearm in the commission of assault, and uttering threats. During the trial, a prosecution witness refused to cooperate, and the trial judge allowed the prosecution to introduce an out of court statement made by the witness into evidence as hearsay. In the judge’s view, the statement had features of substantive reliability in light of the corroborative evidence and the circumstances in which the statement had been made. The Court of Appeal, for the reasons of Doyon and Cournoyer JJ.A., dismissed the accused’s appeal. Bachand J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, as he was of the view that the out of court statement in issue did not satisfy the threshold reliability requirement for being admitted into evidence. He found that the corroborative evidence was not relevant in analyzing the threshold reliability of the assertion made by the witness concerning the appellant’s conduct and words, and that the circumstances in which the statement had been made did not provide sufficient guarantees of substantive reliability. Argued Date 2024-01-18 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Admissibility — Hearsay — Out-of-court statement — Corroborative evidence — Circumstances in which statement made — Whether results of search were considered as corroborative evidence, in accordance with principles enunciated in R. v. Bradshaw, 2017 SCC 35, for purpose of admitting K.A.’s statement into evidence — Whether circumstances of K.A.’s statement provided sufficient guarantees of substantive reliability. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE) (SEALING ORDER) (CERTAIN INFORMATION NOT AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC) On March 23, 2022, the Quebec Court of Appeal issued a redacted version of its reasons, which it had originally delivered on February 28, 2022, allowing the respondent Named Person’s conviction appeal and staying the criminal proceedings brought against Named Person, a police informer. The trial judgment under appeal had not been made public, and all the details of the proceedings, which were held in camera, were unknown to the public. The Court of Appeal ordered that the original version of its judgment and all information in its record be sealed. After the Court of Appeal issued the redacted judgment, the media appellants filed a motion to have the confidentiality orders concerning the appeal record and the trial record lifted in whole or in part. The appellant the Attorney General of Quebec filed a motion to vary the sealing order applicable to the appeal record. The Court of Appeal dismissed the motions. Argued Date 2023-12-12 Keywords Criminal law - Canadian charter (Criminal), Procedure - Criminal law — Charter of Rights — Procedure — Informer privilege — Order that proceedings be held in camera and sealing order — Whether trial judge can proceed outside justice system, completely and totally in camera, without putting together record or revealing very existence of court proceedings, contrary to open court principle protected by s. 2(b) of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Whether, even though police informer privilege is absolute, its unrestrained interpretation may displace constitutional principle of open court proceedings, as Court of Appeal suggested — In addition to identity and list of information that would automatically identify informer, for which there is absolute protection, what test and framework should apply to permit adversarial proceeding in order to decide what other information might identify police informer — When determining facts that may be published while still protecting police informer’s identity, whether judge who hears application should order that interested third parties be notified and have opportunity to be heard on these matters — Whether Court of Appeal erred in refusing to partially unseal its record on ground that this exercise seemed unworkable. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) (Sealing order) (Certain information not available to the public) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Respondent Joseph Power was convicted of two criminal offences in the 1990s. He served a term of imprisonment. In 2010 Mr. Power made inquiries about the process to obtain a pardon, but did not apply for one. In 2011, Mr. Power’s employer learned of his criminal record. He was suspended from work. Mr. Power applied for a pardon — now called a record suspension — in 2013 in order to continue working in his chosen field. However, two enactments since 2010 — the Limiting Pardons for Serious Crimes Act and the Safe Streets and Communities Act — had amended the Criminal Records Act. Transitional provisions in both of the amending acts gave them retrospective application to offences that had occurred before their coming into force. The combined effect of these enactments and their transitional provisions was to render Mr. Power permanently ineligible for a record suspension. Mr. Power lost his job and became ineligible for membership with provincial bodies governing his field of employment. The transitional provisions of both the Limiting Pardons for Serious Crimes Act and the Safe Streets and Communities Act, which gave them retrospective application to offences committed prior to their enactment, were later declared unconstitutional. Mr. Power brought an action against the Crown, alleging that the adoption and application of the transitional provisions constituted conduct that was clearly wrong, undertaken in bad faith, and abusive of government power. He sought damages pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Prior to trial, the appellant Attorney General of Canada sought a determination of questions of law, concerning whether the Crown could ever be held liable in damages in respect of the enactment of legislation that is later declared unconstitutional. The Court of Appeal of New Brunswick upheld the application judge’s determination of those questions, and dismissed the Attorney General’s appeal. Argued Date 2023-12-07 Keywords Constitutional law - Charter of Rights, Remedy (s. 24), Damages - Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Remedy (s. 24) — Damages — Respondent convicted of criminal offences prior to certain amendments to regime for obtaining pardons, but transitional provisions applied the amendments retrospectively — Respondent seeking pardon after employer learned of criminal record, but amendments rendered respondent permanently ineligible for a pardon — Respondent losing his employment — Respondent seeking damages after transitional provisions declared unconstitutional — Whether the Crown may be held liable in damages for government officials and Ministers preparing and drafting legislation that is later declared unconstitutional — Whether the Crown may be held liable in damages for Parliament enacting legislation that is later declared unconstitutional — Limiting Pardons for Serious Crimes Act, S.C. 2010, c. 5 — Safe Streets and Communities Act, S.C. 2012, c. 1 — Criminal Records Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-47. Notes (New Brunswick) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent, British Columbia Securities Commission found that the appellants, Thalbinder Singh Poonian and Shailu Poonian, breached the Securities Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 418, by engaging in conduct that resulted in the misleading appearance of trading activity in, or an artificial price for, a corporation’s shares. It then imposed both a disgorgement order and an administrative penalty against the Poonians. The Commission applied to the BCSC for an order declaring that the amounts owed to it by the Poonians were debts that would not be released by an order of discharge under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act. The BCSC granted the Commission’s application. It concluded that the debts fell within two exemptions to the discharge of debts outlined at s. 178(1) of the BIA: the debts were fines, penalties or restitution orders imposed by a court (s. 178(1)(a)) and they resulted from obtaining property or services by false pretences or fraudulent misrepresentation (s. 178(1)(e)). The Court of Appeal for British Columbia dismissed the appeal. While it disagreed that the sanctions had been imposed by a court, it concluded that the BCSC had not erred in finding that the sanctions in this case fell within the exemption defined in s. 178(1)(e) of the BIA. The fact that the misrepresentation was not made to the creditor, in this case, the Commission, did not preclude the Commission from relying on the exemption. Argued Date 2023-12-06 Keywords Bankruptcy and insolvency - Securities - Bankruptcy and Insolvency — Debts not released by discharge — Securities Commission finding appellants breached Securities Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 418, and imposing disgorgement order and administrative penalties — Courts below granting declaration that amounts appellants owe Securities Commission are not to be released by any order or discharge granted under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act — Whether Court of Appeal erred in finding Commission’s administrative monetary penalties and disgorgement orders survived Poonian’s discharge from bankruptcy — If so, whether Court of Appeal erred in finding creditors seeking to avail themselves of s. 178(1)(e) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act did not have to prove they were same party debtor made direct representations to by fraud or fraudulent pretense — Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, s. 178(1). Notes (British Columbia) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant, John Aquino, was the directing mind of Bondfield Construction Company Limited (“BCCL”) and its affiliate, 1033803 Ontario Inc., commonly known as Forma-Con (“debtor companies”). He and the other appellants carried out a false invoicing scheme over a number of years by which they siphoned off tens of millions of dollars from both debtor companies. The respondents challenged the false invoicing scheme and sought to recover some of the money under s. 96 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and s. 36.1 of the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36. They asserted that the false invoicing scheme was implemented by means of transfers at undervalue by which Mr. Aquino and the debtor companies intended to defraud, defeat or delay a creditor. The appellants asserted that the principles of the common law doctrine of corporate attribution set out in Canadian Dredge & Dock Co. v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 662, did not permit the imputation of Mr. Aquino’s intention to either debtor company. The application judge imputed the fraudulent intention of Mr. Aquino to the corporate debtors. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellants’ appeals. Argued Date 2023-12-05 Keywords Bankruptcy and insolvency - Bankruptcy and Insolvency — Doctrine of corporate attribution — Interpretation of requirement that debtor have intent to defraud, defeat or delay creditor, set out in provision of Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act that permits courts to declare transfers at undervalue void — Courts below holding intent requirement met by attributing intent of companies’ directing mind to the corporate debtors — Whether the Court of Appeal was entitled to reframe the common law corporate attribution doctrine, as formulated in Canadian Dredge & Dock Co. v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 662, and its progeny, within the bankruptcy context — Whether the Court of Appeal made an extricable error in law when it upheld the applications judge’s ruling to the effect that the true financial condition of the corporate debtors, at the time of the impugned transactions, was not “determinative” of whether its directing mind, as a matter of fact, had the requisite intent to defraud, defeat or delay the third-party creditors — Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, s. 96. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE) Mr. Tayo Tompouba was charged with sexual assault. On his first appearance, he was not advised of his right to apply for a trial in French, despite the court’s obligation to inform him of that right under s. 530(3) of the Criminal Code. He was convicted following a trial in English. The Court of Appeal acknowledged that not advising Mr. Tayo Tompouba of his right was an error, but it applied the curative proviso to dismiss his appeal. It held that the right provided for in s. 530(3) is a procedural right, not a substantive right. Argued Date 2023-10-11 Keywords Criminal law - Trial - Criminal law — Trial — Language of accused — French-speaking accused not advised of his right to be tried in official language of his choice — Whether curative proviso in s. 686 of Criminal Code can apply to violation of s. 530(3) of Criminal Code — Whether new trial must be ordered — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 530(3), 686(1)(b). Notes (British Columbia) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE) The appellants are members of the Canadian Armed Forces who had various charges laid against them. They each filed a preliminary application in the Court Martial seeking a stay of proceedings because of an alleged infringement of their constitutional right to be tried by an independent and impartial tribunal guaranteed by s. 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. They argued that their right was infringed by an order by the Chief of Defence Staff dated October 2, 2019 regarding the designation of a commanding officer for purposes of considering disciplinary matters for military judges (“impugned order”). Captain Crépeau, in her application, also asked the tribunal to declare ss. 12, 18 and 60 of the National Defence Act to be of no force or effect, alleging that their combined effect was to allow the Chief of Defence Staff to issue an order, like the impugned order, relating directly to discipline for military judges and thus to permit the military hierarchy to exert pressure on a military judge presiding at a court martial. In a series of decisions, military judges concluded that there was an infringement of the accused’s right guaranteed by s. 11(d) of the Charter. In each of the proceedings, they made a similar declaration to the effect that the impugned order was an infringement of the right set out in s. 11(d) of the Charter. They also stayed the proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter. The Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada allowed the Crown’s appeals, ruling that no informed person would conclude that there was an apprehension of bias or that the independence of courts martial was compromised. It dismissed Captain Crépeau’s cross-appeal. This appeal will be heard jointly with the appeals in files 39822, 40046, 40065 and 40103. Argued Date 2023-10-16 Keywords Canadian charter (Criminal) - Constitutional law, Judicial independence, Armed Forces, Military offences - Charter of Rights — Right to be tried by independent and impartial tribunal — Constitutional law — Judicial independence — Courts martial — Armed forces — Military offences — Since R. v. Généreux, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 259, does the military status of military judges still raise a reasonable apprehension of bias? — Since Généreux, has there been significant societal change which dissipates this Court’s concern that the military status of military judges is a matter of practical necessity? — If so, does the military status of military judges, prescribed under the National Defence Act’s legislative scheme, lead an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically, to conclude that there is an apprehension of bias contrary to s. 11(d) of the Charter? — If so, is this violation justified under s. 1 of the Charter? — If not, what is the appropriate constitutional remedy under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982? — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 11(d) — National Defence Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. N-5, s. 165.21(1) . Notes (Federal) (Criminal) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).