The Ancient Art of Modern Warfare

“The past is a foreign country; they do things differently there.” So begins L.P. Hartley’s book, The Go-Between. Although the way people do things changes over time, what they do remains largely the same. War and politics are human endeavors, and human nature is unchanging. It should be no surprise, therefore, that the nature of war and politics is also unchanging. That is the point of these podcasts. The first objective history of war, the war between Athens and Sparta in the 5th century BC was chronicled by the Greek general Thucydides. Although the way the armies and navies fought then are much different than today, the overall campaigns and reasons for those campaign are strikingly similar to modern strategy. Thucydides’ observations provide lessons for us, even today, if we are just willing to learn from them. This why his work is still studied in our war colleges. Music: Rodgers and R.R. Bennett, Fire on the Water/Victory at Sea Suite (Public Domain/Fair use for educational purposes) Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain) Copland, A. & United States Marine Band. (2000) Fanfare for the Common Man. unpublished, Washington, DC. [Audio] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, (Fair use for educational purposes.)

“Sun Tzu said: The art of war is of vital importance to the State. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected.” My purpose in my podcasts of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare. But who is Sun Tzu, and how is what he said relevant to modern warfare? Music:

Who is this Clausewitz guy? The Army War College studies many different theories and theorists of war, from Thucydides of ancient Athens, Sun Tzu of Wu Dynasty in China, to Machiavelli, Mitchell, and present day theorists. One name stands out among the others, the early 19th century enlightenment era military philosopher, the Prussian Major General and War College Director, Carl von Clausewitz. It is not just the US Army War College. Russian and Chinese military teaching also centers on his ideas. Why? Who was he and why do I cite him so often in my podcasts (and in conversation, my papers, etc.) Working within my self-imposed limit of eight minutes, I try to explain this as best I can. These podcasts are not monetized or subsidized in any way. The opinions expressed in these podcasts are my own and do not necessarily reflect any organization I am or have ever been associated with – and fall far short of doing justice to Carl and Marie von Clausewitz. Reference: Clausewitz, C, On War, Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret ©1984 Music: https://archive.org/details/PreussensGloria_201708

There are more than 110 armed conflicts in the world today.[1] Ending any one of them requires more than a simple cease fire, it requires knowing what each side intends to achieve by the conflict. This is even true when the participants may not fully understand the end state they are seeking. This includes the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East. Without addressing those desired end states any ceasefire merely gives time for the warring parties to refit for the next battles. Whenever our country starts on the path to armed conflict, the citizens must demand that our government know and tell us, “How does this end?” These podcasts are not monetized or subsidized in any way, nor do they represent anyone’s opinion but my own. Music:

If I initiate a war, it seems logical that I would know why I am starting that war and what I expect to achieve by it. It might also be helpful if I let my opponent know that, too, as it may help limit the intensity duration, and long-term effects of that war. Why that is and how that does or doesn’t reflect reality is the subject of this and following episodes of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare. These podcasts are not monetized or subsidized in any way, nor do they represent anyone’s opinion but my own. Reference: Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Book One, Chapter One Music:

The Wagner Group is only one of about two dozen Russian sponsored semi-private military companies conducting combat operations in Ukraine, Africa, and elsewhere. If the operations of the companies violate relevant national and international laws, why aren’t criminal charges being filed against Wagner, affiliated entities, and its operatives? I believe that the answer is more political than legal. I address what some of these political considerations may be in this episode of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare. Disclaimer: These podcasts are not monetized or subsidized in any way, nor do they represent anyone’s opinion but my own. Music:

If we can agree that Russian mercenary-like organizations do not meet the legal criteria of being mercenaries, nor are they legitimate members of the armed forces, then their participation in combat must be illegitimate and their actions criminal. The question remains how to hold those criminal combatants accountable under law. This episode explores the tools for such accountability. Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts do not represent the positions of any organization I am or ever have been associated with. They represent no one's opinions but my own. References Music:

If the Wagner Group and two dozen or so similar Russian paramilitary forces are not mercenaries, not PMSCs, not militia or volunteer corps, then what are they? If the term terrorist to too vague and a criminal organization insufficient, then what can we call them that facilitates accountability for their criminal behavior? Maybe, jut calling them criminals is enough. In Part 3 I propose calling them for what they are, criminals. I will follow this in the next and final episode of this series by examining the means and methods to hold these criminals accountable and bring them to justice. Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the Department of Defense or any other organization I am or have previously been affiliated with. Music: References:

If Wagner and similar Russian mercenary-like organizations do not meet the internationally accepted criteria for being mercenaries or Private Military and Security Companies, then what are they? This podcast explores the suitability of other terms, including militia, volunteer corps, terrorist, and criminal organizations. The challenge is to find a term that accurately describes what they are in a way that offers the possibility for accountability under the law. Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the Department of Defense or any other organization I am or have previously been affiliated with. (In response to comments received, I am trying to keep each podcast down to about 8 minutes.) References: Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18, October 1907, Annex, Chapter 1, Article 1 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment Of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949, Article 4 Music: Wagner, R. and the USMC Band, Siegfrieds Funeral (Public Domain) Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain) Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinamasound (Licensed)

Whether the infamous Wagner continues to exist or not, the problem they created is only growing. There may be more than 30 Russian paramilitary organizations operating across the world, many of them fighting in Ukraine. At least one has a reputation from brutality and criminal conduct rivaling Wagner’s. But what do we call them? They do not fulfil the definition of mercenary in some international conventions, and they are not PMSCs as understood in internationally agreed frameworks or by the UN Working Group on Mercenaries. Holding them accountable under law requires proper definition of what they are and the legal regime to hold them accountable. This problem is the subject of this episode of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare. Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the Department of Defense or any other organization I am or have previously been affiliated with. Music: Listzt, F. and the USMC Band, Les Preludes (Public Domain) Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain) Kiilstofte, P., Mercenaries, Machinamasound (Licensed) References: Article 47, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977. https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-47#:~:text=Article%2047%20%2D%20Mercenaries,-1.&text=A%20mercenary%20shall%20not%20have,or%20a%20prisoner%20of%20war

The presence of Private Security Companies, or PSCs, in conditions of armed conflict continues to be an item of concern to the international community. PSCs seem to blur the distinction between combatants and civilians. They use force, but are not members of the armed forces. Rules for the Use of Force, appropriate to PSC tasks and restrictions under international and local national law, issued by a competent authority and properly enforced, can clarify this murky condition. This episode describes procedures and considerations for developing Rules for the Use of Force relevant to PSCs operating in conditions of armed conflict, post-conflict, and complex emergencies. Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the Department of Defense or any other organization I am or have previously been affiliated with. I am not a military lawyer. Everything I know about drafting RUF came from experience doing that, the wise counsel from experts in the US Department of Justice and the DoD Office of the General Counsel, along with some memorable debates in various international negotiations. Once again, special thanks to the memory of Col. Hays Parks, USMC Ret. Thanks also to Capt. Dennis Mandsager, JAGC USN (Ret.) Music: Listzt, F. and the USMC Band, Les Preludes (Public Domain) Kiilstofte, P., Mercenaries, Machinamasound (Licensed) References: The Montreux Document On pertinent international legal obligations and good practices for States related to operations of private military and security companies during armed conflict, available at https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/foreign-policy/international-law/international-humanitarian-law/private-military-security-companies/montreux-document.html Newport Rules of Engagement Handbook, U.S. Naval War College, available at https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2998&context=ils Sanremo Handbook on Rules of Engagement, the International Institute of Humanitarian Law, available at https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwjdtL7pue-BAxUovokEHS03DrAQFnoECBAQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fiihl.org%2Fsanremo-handbook-rules-engagement%2F&usg=AOvVaw2Mfr7ljzl1-c6EEgmxJCZ2&opi=89978449 DODD 5210.56 w C1, Arming and the Use of Force, available at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/521056p.PDF?ver=PIvIb3eht0obgolnD0UCEw%3d%3d UN Office of Drugs and Crime, Handbook on the Use of Force by Private Security Companies available at https://www.unodc.org/documents/Maritime_crime/19-02086_Private_Security_Company_Handbook_Maritime_Crime_ebook.pdf

The mission of the US Army is to fight and win our nation’s wars. That, however, is not the only task we ask the Army to perform in potentially hostile environments. Missions such as military support to civil authority, humanitarian assistance missions, and disaster relief are not governed by the law of war, but by human rights law. In this context, military use of force is regulated by Rules for the Use of Force (RUF), rather than the combat-oriented Rules of Engagement (ROE). This episode describes the difference between ROE and RUF, the challenges in drafting RUF that can accomplish peacetime missions and protect our troops, while complying with applicable civilian law regarding use of force and firearms. Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the Department of Defense or any other organization I am or have previously been affiliated with. I am not a military lawyer. Everything I know about drafting RUF came from experience doing that, the wise counsel from experts in the US Department of Justice and the DoD Office of the General Counsel, along with some memorable debates in various international negotiations. Once again, special thanks to the memory of Col. Hays Parks, USMC Ret. Thanks also to Capt. Dennis Mandsager, JAGC USN (Ret.) Music: Bagley, E. and The US Army Ceremonial Band, National Emblem, Public Domain Kiilstofte, P., Mercenaries, Machinamasound (Licensed) References: Newport Rules of Engagement Handbook, U.S. Naval War College https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2998&context=ils Sanremo Handbook on Rules of Engagement, the International Institute of Humanitarian Law https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwjdtL7pue-BAxUovokEHS03DrAQFnoECBAQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fiihl.org%2Fsanremo-handbook-rules-engagement%2F&usg=AOvVaw2Mfr7ljzl1-c6EEgmxJCZ2&opi=89978449 CJCSI 33121.01B Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force, declassified version available at: https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/Joint_Staff/20-F-1436_FINAL_RELEASE.pdf DODD 5210.56 w C1, Arming and the Use of Force, available at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/521056p.PDF?ver=PIvIb3eht0obgolnD0UCEw%3d%3d

How do rules of engagement promote compliance with the laws of war when those fighting war seem to do so without any basic consideration of humanity? I think that to answer this question, we must revisit the laws and customs of war, sometimes called International Humanitarian Law. This includes understanding that not every act of violence in war is a war crime. Effective ROE is a control to manage the risk that the violence inherent to war does not become an excuse for war crimes. Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the Department of Defense or any other organization I am or have previously been affiliated with. I am not a military lawyer. Everything I know about law of war came from staff judge advocates telling me what I couldn’t do or how to do the things I wanted to do without going to jail. Special thanks to the memory of Col. Hays Parks, USMC Ret. Music: Holst, G: The Planets, Mars, the Bringer of War (Internet Archive: https://archive.org/details/GustavHolstThePlanetsMarsTheBringerOfWar_201709) Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinimasound (Licensed) References: https://casebook.icrc.org/a_to_z/glossary/war-crimes https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/geneva-conventions-1949additional-protocols-and-their-commentaries

Rules of engagement, or ROE, often get a bad reputation. But what are rules of engagement and why do we need them? If well constructed, ROE focus military action, manage risk of unintended consequences, such as escalation of the conflict and violations of the law of war, and as an economy of force, by minimizing unproductive action. On the other hand, poorly constructed, complex, or difficult to understand ROE, can result in the death of persons who pose no military threat or can surrender tactical advantages leading to unnecessary loss of friendly lives and mission failure. This episode describes what Rules of Engagement are, how they are constructed, and the important role they serve in modern armed conflict. Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the Department of Defense or any other organization I am or have previously been affiliated with. Music: Holst, G: The Planets, Mars, the Bringer of War (Internet Archive: https://archive.org/details/GustavHolstThePlanetsMarsTheBringerOfWar_201709) Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinimasound (Licensed) References: Newport Rules of Engagement Handbook, U.S. Naval War College https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2998&context=ils Sanremo Handbook on Rules of Engagement, the International Institute of Humanitarian Law https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwjdtL7pue-BAxUovokEHS03DrAQFnoECBAQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fiihl.org%2Fsanremo-handbook-rules-engagement%2F&usg=AOvVaw2Mfr7ljzl1-c6EEgmxJCZ2&opi=89978449

It is probable that Russia’s lack of success in Ukraine gives the People’s Republic of China cause for reconsidering any existing plans for an invasion of the Republic of China on Taiwan. Perhaps, using the PRC’s unrestricted war model, they might instead resort to pursuing limited aims that will set conditions for later strategic victory. In other words, limited war. But what is limited war and is limited war even possible in the 21st Century? Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the US Army War College, the Department of Defense, or any other organization I am or have been affiliated with. Music: List: Les Preludes; Abergavenny Symphony Orchestra (Public Domain) Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinimasound (Licensed)

Wagner is dead, or apparently so. At least the senior leadership of PMC Wagner, along with Wagner himself, Dmitri Utkin. What does this mean? Anyone who says they know is either deluding you or deluding themselves. Although the specifics may be in doubt, I believe that Wagner will continue in some form if not in that name. Prigozhin’s statement from Mali last week is correct. The services Wagner type operations provide to Russian strategic interests are too valuable to set aside. Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the US Army War College, the Department of Defense, or any other organization I am or have been affiliated with. Music: Wagner, R. and USMC Band, Siegfried’s Funeral March, Public Domain. Kiilstofte, P., Mercenaries, Machinimasound (Licensed)

Does the recent coup in Niger affect US security interests, or is it just one more coup on a coup plagued continent? Or is it something more than that? Could it be the next campaign in a Hybrid War? If so, who are the contestants? Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the US Army War College, the Department of Defense, or any other organization I am or have been affiliated with Music: Liszt, F. and the USMC Band, Les Preludes, Public Domain Kiilstofte, J., Mercenaries, Machinimasound (Licensed)

Clausewitz wrote that war is an act of violence to force the enemy to do our will. But what is that “will?” A 2019 Rand Study found that there is no official or agreed definition of “will” in the context of warfighting. In this episode, I tackle the question of what will means, why it is important, and the dangers going to war without a national will for victory. (Note: I am full aware of the title. It just sounded more catchy than "The Will to Fight.") Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the US Army War College, the Department of Defense, or any other organization I am or have been affiliated with Music: Holst, G. The Planets: Mars, Bringer of War, Internet Archives, https://archive.org/details/GustavHolstThePlanetsMarsTheBringerOfWar_201709 Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinimasound (Licensed)

Strategy is the application of ways and means to achieve an end. But what are means? This podcast describes the need to look beyond the weapons and other warfighting platforms to, instead, identify the capabilities needed to fight wars. Weapons systems and other elements of national power are resources to enable those capabilities. Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the US Army War College, the Department of Defense, or any other organization I am or have been affiliated with Music: Liszt, F. and the USMC Band, Les Preludes (Public Domian) Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinimasound (Licensed)

What if I told you that civilians can attend the US Army War College? Not US Government employees, but civilians from all walks of life and professions? Two times each year, the Army War College offers that opportunity through its National Security Seminar and Commandant's National Security Program. In this podcast, I describe that program and interview faculty and guests during Battlefield Staff Ride. Disclaimer: The information in this podcast is purely my own and does not represent the official position of the US Army War College or the Department of Defense. In keeping with the non-attribution policy of the War College (Chatham House Rules) the names of persons interviewed are withheld. For official information about these programs, visit: https://ssl.armywarcollege.edu/dde/cnsp/index.cfm https://usawc.org/commandants-national-security-program-cnsp/ https://www.csl.army.mil/nss/ https://usawc.org/national-security-seminar-nss/ Music: Copland, A. & United States Marine Band. (2000) Fanfare for the Common Man. unpublished, Washington, DC. [Audio] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, (Fair use for educational purposes.) Sousa, J.P., & The US Amy Ceremonial Band. National Emblem (Public Domain)