The Caliphs

My personal experiences and opinions on a subject close to my heart and fate. https://www.youtube.com/embed/3xottY-7m3k?si=EGZuBa-wgl3NGieU One of my childhood magazines. The first panel identifies the round ball as Netenyahu, and says, 'A war erupts between Palestine and Israel after Netenyahu says something silly'. The second panel continues, 'Palestine covers Israel in a rain of stones'. Picture I snapped of the Israeli warship on Friday July 14th 2006 with my Nokia phone. It would be damaged in a daring attack by Hezbollah that same night. https://www.youtube.com/embed/tRRrCYX5hJ0?si=q7L8ok9VDa71P4P_

For the very first time in Arab history, a child became the umma’s caliph. The 13 year old had not yet left his royal harem and was totally under his mother’s control. She used her influence over al Muqtadir to to extend her personal wealth and authority. It was a fundamentally corrupt setup that encouraged the worst types of administrative abuses. This cancer at the very top of official power lasted so long it devastated the caliphate far more than any war with a foreign enemy; it was a fall the Abbasids never recovered from.

After all our recent foreshadowing, we’ve finally arrived at the period of Abbasid collapse. It’s a relatively long period, stretching from the start of al Muqtadir’s reign in 908 until around the middle of that century, when the Abbasids were reduced to figureheads by a more commanding dynasty. In an effort to better understand how the ruling clan lost control we’ll take things a bit at a time. A good place to start is with introducing the new caliph and some of the personalities who will play a leading part during his reign.

Cataloguing the tapestry of Islamic traditions is a task that lies well beyond our scope, but every now and again the topic overlaps with the subjects we are interested in. It’s important to understand where the Qaramita and Fatimids came from, because these two foes will face the Abbasid Caliphate until its effective takeover by a rival dynasty. As these two communities emerged from Ismaili Shi’ism, we’ll take the time to properly define and ground these terms before moving on. Please keep in mind that you are in no way getting a round-up of the religious or sectarian situation at the time; there were many more groups than the ones we’re discussing. Refer back to the start of this paragraph for more information.

Reading about this caliph’s reign in our sources is a bewildering experience: everything is simultaneously great and on the brink of destruction. Later histories pick apart developments in the administration throughout al Muktafi’s time in charge in search of a crack or culprit. Meanwhile, the caliphate was going strong, and the Abbasids had no trouble coasting off the considerable momentum al Mu’tadid had established. In the midst of all this, we find al Muktafi, hidden away from sight, doing his thing in the background. He plays such a small part in his own reign that he can hardly be credited with its good or blamed for its bad.

Before you even hit play it should already be clear to you that the caliphate is only going to get stronger over the course of our discussion today. Al Mu’tadid seems to have been incapable of doing any wrong; his decisive leadership reinvigorated the state far beyond what his predecessors had managed. He displayed both courage and cunning during his time in charge, a potent mix that reduced his rivals without the need for open conflict. Although he possessed some disturbing traits al Mu’tadid remains one of the best caliphs to grace the Abbasid throne.

Get ready for a blast from the past! Perhaps I should have prepared you for a weak pun instead. Hearing about this caliph’s reign will transport us back to his great-grandfather al Mu’tasim’s days. Much like his esteemed ancestor, the energetic new leader commanded his armies in person and used them to restore his caliphate to a lost glory. Our sources are effusive in their praise of this caliph, and he’s easily the most popular Abbasid figure we’ve come across in many generations.

Al Mu’tamid’s reign lasted from 870 to 892. The Abbasid Caliphate was reborn during these decades, midwifed by the caliph’s brother Talha, better known in history by his title al Muwaffaq. The new Abbasid state understood its limits and adopted a pragmatic but uncompromising approach towards rebuilding its power. It developed formidable armies to fight off the many existential threats that faced it, then used this military edge to force its neighbors into relative submission.

Having covered the caliphate’s East last time, we must now do the same for its west. The anarchy left such a deep impact on the caliphate that we really need to take our time discovering its aftermath. The situation in Egypt, Syria, Mesopotamia, and the North was very messy, but we’ll look at them through the lens of one remarkable soldier. His journey started in Egypt, but spanned the caliphate’s west, giving us a window into the entire region’s politics at the time.

We have been focused exclusively on the capital province of Iraq ever since the outbreak of anarchy. While we had good reasons to keep a close eye on developments there, Khurasan can no longer be ignored. Not only had it always been a vital part of the Abbasid realm, but the relationship between the Arabs and their neighbors to the East practically defined Arab power. The collapse of imperial authority had consequences in Nisapur, and when the Tahirids faltered kharijites stood ready to pounce.

Now that the anarchy was over, a reduced but reunited Abbasid military could finally face up to the multitude of threats facing the caliphate. A slave insurrection in the south of Iraq was one of the earliest challenges it had to contend with, and the state’s slow and faltering response revealed the extent of the decline of Abbasid power. The caliphate did ultimately come out on top, thanks to the assiduous regent general Talha, and his worthy son Ahmad.

The death of Salih ibn Waseef left Musa ibn Bugha in charge of the caliphate’s armies. This newfound unity effectively ended the Anarchy in Samarra which had plagued the Abbasid state for almost a decade. While the dark period of civil war was over, the Abbasid state now had to contend with its consequences and the many dangers it spawned.

Dilapidated by years of internal conflict and ruinous mismanagement, the caliphate was a mere shadow of its former self. The void left by its collapse had led to the rise of adversaries which now surrounded the capital province and threatened the state’s very existence. Not only was the treasury empty, but the state’s armies were divided and their leaders still quarreled over scraps. These were the unfortunate conditions of al Muhtadi’s reign, and the powerless caliph could do little to reform the situation.

Instead of bringing about a measure of peace, the end of the civil war signaled a return to the anarchy that had preceded it. The new caliph was restricted by the same men whose influence had checked his predecessor’s. Furthermore, by accepting the role of a puppet, al Musta’in had sullied the Abbasid name and done irreparable damage to the caliph’s authority in the eyes of the umma, and more critically, the troops. Also did I mention that the caliphate was broke?

As the last vestiges of Abbasid authority crumbled, the caliphate spiraled further into chaos. It wasn’t too long before an unremarkable conflict sparked a much wider conflagration and the umma was engulfed by civil war. The turks treated the Abbasids as little more than a banner, and each side rallied behind the candidate they understood would look after their interests the best. The fitna of 865 proved disastrous to Baghdad and Iraq, but the rest of the umma seemed to enjoy the downfall of the unpopular Turks, and they capitalized on their absence by exercising more independence.

Al Muntasir’s sudden passing took the caliphate into uncharted political territory. It had only been six months since the plot against his father had succeeded, and he was still much too young for succession planning. The Turks tried to capitalize on this disaster: in an attempt to make the most out of the situation they installed a figurehead in command, one they could control with impunity. Little did they know that in doing so they were kicking Pandora’s box wide open.

It’s difficult to overstate the impact al Mutawakkil’s usurpation had on the political reality of the caliphate. Not only did it completely hijack control of the state, but it also had decisive implications for the nature and locus of official authority. We’ll kick off our journey into this brave new world with the short reign of al Muntasir. Its unexpected end will unfortunately only make the umma’s politics more volatile. Things were bad, but they’re about to become a whole lot worse.

Succession planning presented a sporadic problem for the caliphate. The great fitna was the last disaster spawned by ill-conceived designs, and it proved absolutely ruinous to the state. Al Mutawakkil’s arrangement was so bad that it became the first to snare the caliph himself in its chaos. As with most things about him, there’s no consensus on what happened or why. Al Mutawakkil’s reign and character are subjects of considerable disagreement, complicating any assessment of this caliph’s legacy.

Despite the religious overtones of the caliphate, there was nothing very islamic about the state when it came to policy. The inquisition marked the first time an administration tried to interfere in matters of faith, and it intensified over the reigns of three caliphs. Al Mutawakkil put an end to the mihna, and reversed the state’s position on a slew of related matters. His new direction proved popular with the masses, but it discriminated heavily against a wide range of communities.

Considering their invincibility on the battlefield, the caliphate’s armies probably felt assured that they would remain the state’s number one priority. Al Mutawakkil’s purge of the administration only touched one member of the military hierarchy, and the caliph could not kill off its leadership if he required an effective fighting force. Although he sought to weaken the Turkish grip on the military, al Mutawakkil still needed them to win his many, many wars. Neither side could do without the other, but it was an uneasy relationship as the caliph looked for ways out of it.