Decisive Point Podcast

This article argues that the People’s Republic of China uses its police and internal security forces as a nontraditional means of projecting strategic Landpower in the Indo-Pacific and Central Asia. Instead of limiting analysis of China’s power projection to military forces, this article employs new data on Chinese police engagements abroad to fill a gap in our understanding of the operating environment in Asia. Policymakers will gain an understanding of how these activities enhance China’s presence, partnerships, and inf luence across the region to inform the development of recommendations for a more effective response. Read the article here: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol54/iss1/5/ Email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Keywords: China, strategic Landpower, internal security, security force assistance, police

Domestic constraints make it difficult for the United States to pursue a coherent program of restraint in the Middle East. As events in Gaza revive debates about the appropriate size and scope of the military footprint in the region, this article shows the importance of grounding any revised posture on a firm domestic foundation. Going beyond accounts that blame the obstructionism of a foreign policy establishment, it explores barriers to strategic adjustment and supports its claims through a case study of the Obama administration’s record, drawn from relevant literature, data on the distribution of military capabilities, and interviews with senior officials. Read the article here: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol54/iss1/8/ Email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Keywords: Middle East, restraint, public opinion, domestic politics, polarization, civil-military relations Download the transcript: https://media.defense.gov/2024/May/01/2003454360/-1/-1/0/DP-5-4-PAYNE-TRANSCRIPT.PDF

Domestic constraints make it difficult for the United States to pursue a coherent program of restraint in the Middle East. As events in Gaza revive debates about the appropriate size and scope of the military footprint in the region, this article shows the importance of grounding any revised posture on a firm domestic foundation. Going beyond accounts that blame the obstructionism of a foreign policy establishment, it explores barriers to strategic adjustment and supports its claims through a case study of the Obama administration’s record, drawn from relevant literature, data on the distribution of military capabilities, and interviews with senior officials. Read the article here: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol54/iss1/8/ Email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Keywords: Middle East, restraint, public opinion, domestic politics, polarization, civil-military relations

Self-deterrence is critically understudied in deterrence theory. Similarly, deterrence practitioners prefer to focus on adversaries’ threats rather than seeking to account for the full scope of fears influencing the decision calculus of policymakers. Through historical case studies, this article identifies where self-deterrence has occurred, highlights the benefits of incorporating the concept in future strategic planning and intelligence assessments, and recommends that policymakers, strategists, and analysts acknowledge self-deterrence as an important factor when preparing for future wars. Read the article here: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol54/iss1/9/ Email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Keywords: deterrence, self-deterrence, chemical weapons, nuclear weapons, decision making

This article proposes a new definition of strategy as problem-solving that challenges the focus on goals and assumptions of order within many post–Cold War approaches to strategy. It argues that the military needs strategy to diagnose the complex problems of the twenty-first century before they can be solved. Inspired by practitioners such as Andrew Marshall and George F. Kennan, this new definition clarifies what strategists do and offers a logic for distinguishing the use of the term strategy. Practitioners will also find problem-solving tools and pedagogies they can adopt today. Email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Keywords: complexity, Andrew Marshall, George F. Kennan, problem-solving, strategy

New strategic art is required to maneuver political economies to meet the demands of future engagements and campaigns. Current discussions of the projection of political-economic power are typically abstract, high-level, and policy-focused or present singular tactical actions as strategic actions, creating a gap for campaign practitioners. This article addresses the gap by drawing on Joint Planning, Joint Publication 5-0, and Joint Campaigns and Operations, Joint Publication 3-0, to further develop the concept and methodologies first introduced in the author’s earlier article “Multidimensionality: Rethinking Power Projection for the 21st Century.” Read the article here: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol54/iss1/4/ Email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Keywords: sanctions, political-economic power, Russia, Ukraine, China

If the United States and its allies seek to deny Vladimir Putin an objective victory in the Russia-Ukraine War, they must commit to providing sufficient aid to the Ukrainian army soon because the window of opportunity to provide sufficient resources is narrow—and closing. This article argues that the West must articulate a reasonable strategy for Ukrainian victory now, as a failure in Ukraine will weaken relationships between the United States and Western European states and their global partners while emboldening state and non-state actors to threaten the rules-based international order. Read the article here: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol54/iss1/3/ Email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Keywords: Ukraine, Russia, NATO, Europe, security force assistance

Retired United States general and flag officers participate politically as individuals and in groups. Purportedly, participation damages civil-military relations. This article argues these activities, including but not limited to endorsements of candidates, do little harm to US democratic institutions and to the nonpartisan reputation of the military institution. Read the article here: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss4/15/. Email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Keywords: civil-military relations, general officers, promotions, flag officers, political participation

To compete effectively for global influence, US Army and defense planners should focus on economic globalization in addition to security interests when assessing potential foreign military partners. The results of a quantitative analysis of US-led exercise participants between 1990 and 2016 demonstrate the variety of interests, including economic, that underly a partner’s decision to train or not with US forces. Since the US Army bills itself as the “partner of choice,” this piece will interest military and policy practitioners involved in strategically assessing potential international military partners. Read the article here: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss4/13/ Email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Keywords: economic interests, globalization, strategic competition, multinational exercises, bilateral exercises

The China Landpower Studies Center will open in 2024. It is intended to be an approachable organization. It will tackle the complex and pressing questions about China’s emergence as a global power and its implications for the US military and provide senior leaders and practitioners with a better understanding of the strategies, capabilities, and the integration of the PLA into the CCP’s campaign to turn the rules-based international order to its advantage. Further, the Center will share insights and recommendations for developing better deterrence strategies and campaigns for the United States and our allies Read the article here: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss4/16/ Email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Keywords: China, Taiwan, Philippines, South China Sea, China Landpower Studies Center

Reflexive control aims to change the other’s perceptions about their utility sets. It contains underlying elements that could help give structure to analyses of strategic behavior by using a nonlinear approach that aims to improve the quality of assessments. This podcast explores the interpretations of the concept of reflexive control, how elements of ref lexive control link to the more widely accepted body of knowledge, and how these elements could be valuable additions to the current work on the analysis of strategic behavior. E-mail usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Keywords: reflexive control, strategic behavior, strategic analysis, nonlinearity, complex adaptive system

This podcast enters the debate on American grand strategy by questioning the logic underpinning offshore balancing. It concludes that the United States is an ambivalent balancer due to the stopping power of water. It builds on the relevant literature in international relations, producing a novel set of theoretical propositions that are applied to the contemporary Middle East. There and elsewhere, the United States could fail to maintain the balance of power when it is most threatened.

A change in deterrence thought and strategy is necessary to avoid nuclear escalation in armed conflict with Russia. Traditional threat-based deterrence strategies will not be successful, and a new strategy must address the conditions that might cause Russian leadership to employ nuclear weapons. An examination of the Able Archer 83 exercise using an original framework highlights the ways Russian interests and US actions interact to generate misperception and inhibited deterrence. The US military must execute extremely restrained, deliberate, and empathetic operations that pursue minimalist military objectives to achieve the political goal. Read the article here: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss4/10/ Email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Keywords: deterrence, nuclear, misperception, Russia, multidomain operations

The Russia-Ukraine War holds many lessons for the US Army and American policymakers and leaders on the nature and role of reconnaissance-strike complexes in modern combat, especially Ukraine’s development of a battle-management system that uses unmanned aerial systems and satellite reconnaissance to enable the fire coordination for deep strikes into the enemy rear. In the research presented here, open-source analysis and interviews in Ukraine focus on the development and employment of reconnaissance-strike complexes with respect to deep strike and the likelihood of mutual territorial attack. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss4/9/ Keywords: unmanned aerial systems, deep strike, reconnaissance-strike complex, electronic warfare, Russia-Ukraine War Email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on the genesis article or the podcast.

In February 2022, many observers initially evaluated the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a failure of Western deterrence.That assessment was and is f lawed inasmuch as the West never articulated a clear strategy to deter such an invasion. Engaging with relevant conceptual debates about how deterrence works and relating this information to what the West did and did not do in the run-up to the invasion, this article shows that deterrence efforts were based on problematic assumptions about the Kremlin’s motivations. The study concludes with lessons for Western military and policy practitioners with the intention to enable better future thinking about how to deter Russia. Keywords: deterrence, Ukraine, Russia, Putin, NATO Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss4/8

Due to a global trend toward urbanization and Russian and Chinese aggression toward Ukraine and Taiwan, respectively, urban resistance to occupation merits greater study. The research here presents a much-needed and unique analysis of Dutch-language primary sources on the Netherlands’ World War II urban resistance to occupation. It provides deeper insights into the occupation experiences of a highly urbanized, densely populated country in which clandestine underground and auxiliary elements played paramount roles in resistance efforts for most of the occupation period. It also illustrates the feasibility of overt, guerrilla-based activity in urban environments during the final phase of a conflict and offers insights into an understudied Landpower activity that modern at-risk countries should develop and hone. Read the article here: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss3/14/ Email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Keywords: resistance to occupation, Resistance Operating Concept, underground, special operations forces, megacity

The Antarctic Treaty of 1961 largely prevented conflicts on the continent, but growing pressure on the treaty system could affect the global community and the United States. This article utilizes historical documents and press reports to examine these challenges, which include ice deterioration, unreported and unregulated fishing, resource extraction preparation, and hostilities between treaty members. Given that these challenges involve China and Russia, it is in the United States’ interest to understand them and the potential request for US military intervention to maintain global security and treaty interests. Read the article here: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss3/12/ Email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Keywords: Antarctica, Antarctic Treaty, sea levels, unreported and unregulated fishing, global power competition

Taiwan has become increasingly important to the United States and its allies as the Russia-Ukraine War has united democracies against authoritarian expansionism and indeed has developed an international democracy-authoritarianism dynamic in global affairs. Part one of this article clearly outlined the geopolitical, economic, and soft-power reasons why Taiwan is strategically important. Part two reviews the development of US and allied policy statements on Taiwan—from the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 to the present—and provides policymakers and military strategists with incremental but realistic recommendations for understanding the current dynamic of the region and fashioning responses to deter further authoritarian aggression. Read the article here: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss3/11/ Email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Keywords: Taiwan, China, Russia, Ukraine, National Security Strategy, Biden

The United States must place Russia’s focus on geographic concerns at the center of future strategy development to build a constructive relationship with Russia and achieve US regional goals. This article analyzes Russia’s geography and historical impact on Russian foreign policy, outlines Moscow’s current foreign policy goals, and highlights underlying concerns for US policymakers and military practitioners. By pursuing policies that support Russian goals of economic integration, mitigation of demographic concerns, and security of national borders, the United States can set the foundation for productive engagement on critical issues. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss3/13/ Keywords: US-Russian relations, geopolitics, military strategy, demographics, diplomacy, geography, economic investment Episode Transcript Email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Keywords: strategic inflection point, Ukraine, multidomain operations (MDO), mission command, large-scale combat operations (LSCO) Stephanie Crider (Host) You’re listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors, and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, The US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I’m talking today with Major Caitlin Irby, author of “US Russia Foreign Policy: Confronting Russia’s Geographic Anxieties,” (https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss3/13/) which was published in the autumn 2023 issue of Parameters. Irby is an Air Force Intelligence officer currently serving at Fort Liberty, NC. Welcome to Decisive Point, Caitlin. Caitlin P. Irby Good morning, and thanks for having me. Host Your article takes on the topic of the future of US Russia policy. What inspired you to write this piece? Irby Well, I really started studying Russia during my assignment at Special Operations Command, Europe. “I got there in 2015, so it was shortly after the Russian incursion into Crimea and the Donbas. I enjoyed that work so much, I started reading about Russia outside of work and in my free time. And I really started thinking about the fact that the US goal was stated to deter Russia, but we had obviously failed at that a couple of times at this point. And so, I started just sort of thinking about what might actually work in line with all of my reading. And then, unfortunately, we failed again come 2022. So, really, this article is a conclusion of about seven years worth of me thinking about the subject. Host In your article you address two types of geography. What are they? Irby Geography is broken into physical and human geography. In the military, we tend to really focus on physical geography: mountains, rivers, key terrains. But there’s also human geography, which can involve the spatial distribution of human characteristics like ethnicity, industry, or political boundaries. It’s fairly unusual for analysts to group all of these together as part of a geographic analysis, so I really wanted to highlight both sides of the field Host How does geography influence Russian leaders? Irby On the physical geography side, Russian leaders have historically had to compete with Russia’s insecure boundaries. They’re located on the European Plain. That really creates an insecure homeland. As a response, throughout history, they have had to militarily expand to keep their core safe, and this really manifests in trading space for time when an invading army tries to attack them, such as with Hitler and Napoleon. So, that’s one aspect: expansion is viewed as a matter of national survival. The second major physical geographic factor is their lack of access to warm-water ports. This is particularly relevant today in a globalized economy because Russia can’t export their primary exports, so oil and natural gas, like many countries do via the ocean. They have to use pipelines, which forces...

A Call to Action: Lessons from Ukraine for the Future Force Fifty years ago, the US Army faced a strategic inflection point after a failed counterinsurgency effort in Vietnam. In response to lessons learned from the Yom Kippur War, the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command was created to reorient thinking and doctrine around the conventional Soviet threat. Today’s Army must embrace the Russo-Ukrainian conflict as an opportunity to reorient the force into one as forward-thinking and formidable as the Army that won Operation Desert Storm. This episode suggests changes the Army should make to enable success in multidomain large-scale combat operations at today’s strategic inflection point. Read the article here: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss3/10/ Read the episode transcript below. Email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Keywords: strategic inflection point, Ukraine, multidomain operations (MDO), mission command, large-scale combat operations (LSCO) Episode Transcript Stephanie Crider (Host) You're listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I'm talking with Lieutenant Colonel Katie Crombe and Dr. John A. Nagl today, authors of “A Call to Action: Lessons from Ukraine for the Future Force,” which was published in the autumn 2023 issue of Parameters. (https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss3/10/) Crombe is an Army strategist currently assigned to the joint staff. She was the chief of staff of an integrated research project commissioned by TRADOC (Training and Doctrine Command) during academic year 2023 at the US Army War College. Nagl is a professor of war fighting studies at the US Army War College and was the director of an integrated research project commissioned by TRADOC during academic year 2023. Welcome to Decisive Point, Katie and John. John A. Nagl Thanks, Stephanie, it's good to be here. Katie Crombe Thanks, Stephanie. Host Katie, please give our audience some background and tell us about the establishment of TRADOC (Training and Doctrine Command). Katie Crombe During this study, we went back to the last strategic inflection point that we saw the Army go through. And we recognized that as 1973, following the Yom Kippur War. And so, we began digging a little bit deeper on why that was such an important point for the US Army. What we realized was not only the Secretary of Defense, but the Chief of Staff of the Army at the time, Creighton Abrams, had a revolutionary and evolutionary leader in a guy named General William E. DePuy, who was a combat leader in World War II but also known for being a deep and thoughtful intellectual. They knew that the Army needed to change. They knew that the Army needed to rise to the occasion of the conventional Soviet threat, and they figured that the training and education that the Army had established was not going to get us there. So, they had General DePuy stand up something called Training and Doctrine Command in 1973. And what he did right at the beginning was do a deep study on the 1973 Yom Kippur War through a couple of lenses, both his intellectual lens—you know, he was just deeply interested in that as a curious man— and also, his combat lens, as he lost 100 percent of his battalion in World War II. That deeply affected him, and he wanted to ensure that the US Army never faced this again. So, when he established Training and Doctrine Command, his concept was really to lead training and education and do this through a series of exercises, different ways to train, and also the development of new fighting manuals that the Army would read at echelon. Everyone from the lowest in the squad up to the division commander really could understand how and why people were fighting. And so, we...